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INTRODUCTION 
 Nearly thirty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
whether “the survival of a relatively small number of three-inch fish 
among all the countless millions of species extant would require 
the permanent halting of a virtually completed dam for which 
Congress has expended more than $100 million.”1  Stunningly, the 
fish won, because the language, history, and structure of the 
Endangered Species Act showed “beyond doubt that Congress 
intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of 
priorities.”2  The Court acknowledged that this view of the statute 
would carry substantial economic costs,3 but was persuaded that 
“[t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt 
and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the 
cost.”4  The Court’s decision in Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) v. 
Hill served notice that the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) had the 
power to become one of the nation’s most important 
environmental laws. 
The ESA provision that stopped the dam and saved the snail 
darter5 was section 7(a)(2), which commands each federal agency 
to “insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by 
such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence 
of any endangered species or threatened species . . . .”6  The Court 
stated that this provision “admits of no exception,”7 and that “[o]ne 
would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision whose terms 
were any plainer than those in § 7 of the Endangered Species Act.”8 
1. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172 (1978). 
2. Id. at 174.  The Endangered Species Act is codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544(2000). 
3. Id. 
4. Id. at 184. 
5. Ultimately, Tellico Dam was built when Congress ordered its completion despite the 
ESA.  The completion and closing of the dam wiped out the largest known population of 
snail darters, but the species has not gone extinct.  See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 801–02 (3d ed. 2004). 
6. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).  Federal agencies also must ensure that their actions do 
not “result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is 
determined . . . to be critical.”  Id.  The statute does not define “jeopardize the continued 
existence” as used in § 7(a)(2), but ESA implementing rules define the term to mean “to 
engage in an action that reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce 
appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed species in the wild by 
reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that species.”  50 C.F.R. § 402.02. 
7. 437 U.S. at 173. 
8. Id. 
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The Supreme Court interpreted that same statutory provision 
very differently in 2007, when it decided National Association of Home 
Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife.9  Where TVA v. Hill saw plain 
meaning, National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) found a 
“fundamental ambiguity that is not resolved by that statutory text” 
of § 7(a)(2);10 where TVA v. Hill saw no exceptions, NAHB found it 
reasonable to limit the application of § 7 to those actions where a 
federal agency exercises discretionary authority.11  The NAHB 
decision acknowledged the power of § 7(a)(2), but effectively 
limited the statute’s reach.12 
NAHB dealt with Clean Water Act (“CWA”) permitting 
authority;13 unlike TVA v. Hill, the case did not directly decide the 
fate of one particular dam.  But the NAHB decision has strong 
implications for hundreds of dams associated with federal water 
projects, the operation of which could affect threatened or 
endangered species.  Under the Reclamation program,14 the 
federal government built nearly 200 projects in seventeen western 
states15 for a variety of purposes, primarily irrigation.16  Today, the 
9. 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007). 
10. Id. at 2534.  The Court saw ambiguity because it regarded the “no jeopardy” mandate 
of § 7(a)(2) as conflicting with other statutes that impose requirements on agencies, raising 
a question of implied repeal. 
11. Id. at 2534, 2536.  In order to avoid the potential for implied repeal of statutory 
mandates by ESA § 7, the Court upheld an agency rule, 50 C.F.R. § 402.03, which provides 
that § 7 applies to agency actions where there is discretionary federal involvement or control. 
12. The Court characterized TVA v. Hill as consistent with the idea that § 7(a)(2) “applies 
to every discretionary agency action—regardless of the expense or burden its application 
might impose.”  Id. at 2537, 2531–32 (describing § 7(a)(2) as a “seemingly categorical” 
legislative command, and as “imperative”). 
13. The question in that case was whether the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) 
must comply with ESA § 7 in deciding whether to grant the State of Arizona’s request for 
authority to issue pollution discharge permits under Clean Water Act § 402 (33 U.S.C. § 
1342).  The Court held that § 402 gave EPA no discretion to consider the needs of listed 
species in making that decision, and so the agency was not required to comply with § 7.  Id. 
at 2537–38. 
14. Because this article focuses on the Reclamation program, it does not address federal 
water projects managed by the Army Corps of Engineers or other agencies.  These other 
projects, built and operated for a wide range of purposes including flood control, navigation, 
hydropower, and recreation, are governed by a set of laws that differs significantly from those 
that govern Reclamation projects, which generally operate primarily (though not 
exclusively) for irrigation.  See generally In re Operation of the Missouri River System Litig., 
421 F.3d 618 (8th Cir. 2005) (examining the law governing Corps of Engineers’ operation of 
federal facilities on the Missouri River for multiple purposes). 
15. The seventeen Reclamation states reach from North Dakota to Texas and west to the 
Pacific Ocean. 
16. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 
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U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (“USBR”)17 operates these projects to 
supply water for a variety of purposes, chiefly irrigation of crops 
and pasture in the arid West.  Nearly all of these projects predate 
the 1973 enactment of the ESA, but courts have held that USBR’s 
ongoing operation of these projects is a federal agency action 
requiring compliance with ESA § 7.18 
The NAHB decision bears on the question of whether § 7(a)(2) 
will continue to apply to the operation of Reclamation projects by 
USBR.19  In recent litigation, USBR has argued that it lacks the 
discretion to operate its projects so as to provide water for 
endangered species habitats because that water is already legally 
committed to existing users.20  By upholding the rule limiting the 
applicability of § 7 to discretionary federal actions, and by holding 
that the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) lacked 
discretion to consider endangered species under CWA § 402, 
NAHB may increase the chances that USBR’s project operations 
will be classified as the kind of non-discretionary activity that is 
exempt from § 7 requirements. 
Amicus briefs filed with the Supreme Court in NAHB show that 
water users were hoping that the Court’s decision in that case 
would bolster their arguments against the application of § 7 to 
Reclamation projects.  One brief argued that § 7(a)(2) does not 
override an agency’s prior commitments, including contracts to 
supply water from federal projects: 
 
Thus, for example, if the Bureau of Reclamation enters into contracts 
with water users, which obligate the Bureau to deliver water from 
federal reclamation facilities to the users, the Bureau does not have 
discretion to reallocate the water for the benefit of endangered 
species, absent a reservation of authority in the contracts to reallocate 
the water for this purpose.21 
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 3–4, available at http://www.usbr.gov/history/BRIEFHist.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2007). 
17. USBR is part of the Department of the Interior. 
18. See infra Part I.C  and accompanying text. 
19. Some projects are operated by water user entities, such as irrigation districts, under 
an agreement with USBR, but the agency retains final authority over the operations and 
maintenance of Reclamation projects, including environmental compliance.  See U.S. DEP’T 
OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, RECLAMATION MANUAL WTR PO5 (2004), 
available at http://www.usbr.gov/recman/wtr/wtr-p05.pdf. 
20. See infra notes 221–268 and accompanying text. 
21. Brief for Ass’n of California Water Agencies et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 29, Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 
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Another amicus brief argued that if § 7 applies so broadly as to 
cover water deliveries from Reclamation projects, it would probably 
result in “chaos in Western water distribution, resulting in 
shortages, waste, and misallocation by federal officials who have 
neither the resources nor the experience to allocate and deliver 
this life-giving resource to those who put it to beneficial use.”22 
This article examines the applicability of § 7(a)(2) to USBR’s 
project operations in the wake of NAHB.  Part I briefly offers 
background on Reclamation projects, the ESA, and cases applying 
§ 7 to the operation of these projects.  Part II examines the rule 
limiting the application of § 7 to discretionary agency actions, and 
reviews caselaw from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applying 
this rule to federal activities.  Part III discusses the Supreme Court’s 
NAHB decision and its implications for the application of § 7 to 
arguably non-discretionary federal agency actions.  Part IV 
addresses legal and policy issues relating to the ESA and 
Reclamation projects, and concludes that § 7(a)(2) should 
continue to apply to USBR’s project operations. 
The applicability of § 7 to Reclamation projects is an issue of 
huge importance for several reasons.  First, a great many people 
rely on these projects for their water supply.  USBR supplies water 
to about 20 percent of farmers in the West, providing for irrigation 
of close to 10 million acres.23  Second, the protection of § 7 may be 
key to the survival and recovery of many species in the West, where 
large-scale irrigation often places aquatic species in peril.24  Third, 
competition for water from Reclamation projects will only grow 
over time because of ongoing changes in the West’s water supplies 
and demands caused by factors such as population growth, climate 
(2007) (Nos. 06-340, 06-549), 2007 WL 549099. 
22. Brief for Kern County Water Agency et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 
9, Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007) (Nos. 06-340, 
06-549), 2007 WL 549105. 
23. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION—ABOUT US, 
http://www.usbr.gov/main/about/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).  USBR projects also generate 
enough hydropower for 6 million homes and provide public water for about 31 million 
people, id., although more than 80 percent of the water from these projects goes to 
irrigation.  U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, 
ACREAGE LIMITATION AND WATER CONSERVATION RULES AND REGULATIONS  3-2 (Feb. 1996). 
24. Michael R. Moore et al., Water Allocation in the American West: Endangered Fish versus 
Irrigated Agriculture, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 319, 348 (1996) (finding that counties in the West 
with the greatest amount of irrigated agriculture also have the highest number of 
endangered fish species). 
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change, and a growing number of species listed as threatened or 
endangered. 
Moreover, the effect of the ESA on USBR project operations is 
important nationally, not just in the West.  The 2001 Klamath Basin 
water crisis resulted from the application of § 7 to one of the oldest 
Reclamation projects.25  When longtime irrigators faced severe and 
unprecedented cutbacks in water supplies caused by an extreme 
drought and the need to protect endangered fish, it caused one of 
the greatest controversies in the history of the ESA.26  The following 
year, when USBR took a narrow view of its § 7 duties27 and restored 
full irrigation deliveries from the Klamath Project, salmon perished 
by the thousands as the Klamath River downstream suffered from 
low flows and high temperatures.28  The irrigation cutback and the 
salmon die-off both attracted national attention,29 demonstrating 
how events involving endangered species and water users in the 
West can have great national significance for the ESA. 
I. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION PROJECTS AND THE ENDANGERED 
SPECIES ACT 
A. Federal Reclamation Projects 
Congress launched the Reclamation program in 1902, 
authorizing the Interior Secretary to build and operate large-scale 
projects to irrigate the arid West.30  Under this program the 
25. For a description of Klamath Basin water issues and background on the 2001 water 
crisis, see Reed D. Benson, Giving Suckers (and Salmon) an Even Break: Klamath Basin Water and 
the Endangered Species Act, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 197 (2002). 
26. See Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish, Farms and the Clash of Cultures in the Klamath 
Basin, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 279, 319–27 (2003). 
27. See id. at 327–33.  USBR’s ten-year operating plan for the Klamath Project and the 
Biological Opinion supporting it were ultimately overturned by the courts as providing 
insufficient protection to threatened coho salmon in the Klamath River below the project.  
See Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082, 
1089 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that government did not appeal district court’s rejection of 
provision whereby Klamath Project would provide only 57% of necessary flows for salmon, 
with remaining 43% to come from other sources); id. at 1090–91 (rejecting provision 
allowing delivery of less than full water supplies needed by salmon for the first eight years of 
the ten-year plan). 
28. See Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 26, at 334–36. 
29. See, e.g., Douglas Jehl, Cries of ‘Save the Suckerfish’ Rile Farmers’ Political Allies, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 20, 2001, at A1; Timothy Egan, As Thousands of Salmon Die, Fight for River Erupts Again, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2002, at A1. 
30. Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified in scattered 
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Reclamation Service (later USBR) built dams, canals, and other 
facilities, and operated these projects to supply water to small 
family farms.31 By the 1990s, the federal government had built 
nearly 200 Reclamation projects throughout 17 western states, with 
347 storage reservoirs, 268 major pumping plants, and over 60,000 
miles of water distribution canals, pipelines, and ditches.32 
Reclamation statutes are of two basic types:  first, the 1902 
Reclamation Act and later statutes of general applicability that set 
national policy for the entire USBR program,33 and second, project-
specific statutes that may, for example, authorize the construction 
of a new project,34 or address the operation, management and 
purposes of an existing project.35  Most USBR projects operate 
subject to both the general reclamation statutes and those that 
pertain to a particular project, although Congress may exempt a 
particular project from one or more features of the general laws.36  
The general statutes establish standard terms and procedures for 
the entire program; for example, these statutes authorize certain 
types of contracts for delivery of project water and limit the amount 
of land that one owner can irrigate with subsidized water.  By 
contrast, project authorizing acts specify such things as the 
purposes of a particular project or the limits on total acreage 
irrigated by that project.37 
USBR manages and supplies water for a variety of uses in 
addition to irrigation.38 This water is often called “project water” 
because it is stored, diverted, or delivered by the facilities of a 
sections of 43 U.S.C. from § 371 to § 498). 
31.  U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, ACREAGE 
LIMITATION AND WATER CONSERVATION RULES AND REGULATIONS 3-2 (Feb. 1996). 
32. Id. 
33. Examples of general reclamation laws after 1902 include § 9 of the 1939 Reclamation 
Project Act, 43 Stat. 1194 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 485h), and the 1982 Reclamation Reform 
Act, Pub. L. No. 97-295, 96 Stat. 1263 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 390aa–390zz-1). 
34. See, e.g., Act of June 3, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-488, 74 Stat. 156 (authorizing the San Luis 
Unit of the Central Valley Project). 
35. The best known example of a statute that addresses various aspects of a pre-existing 
project is the 1992 Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, Title 
XXXIV, 106 Stat. 4706 (1992). 
36. For example, the Boulder Canyon Project Act exempted recipients of Boulder 
Canyon Project water from the acreage limitations provided in the general reclamation laws.  
See Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980). 
37. See Reed D. Benson, Whose Water Is It? Private Rights and Public Authority over Reclamation 
Project Water, 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 363, 369--72 (1997). 
38. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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federal Reclamation project.39 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
has made it clear that project water is legally distinct from other 
kinds of water: 
 
A distinction must be recognized between the nature of nonproject 
water, such as natural flow water, and project water, and between the 
manner in which rights to use of such waters are obtained.  Right to 
use of natural-flow water is obtained in accordance with state law.  In 
most western states it is obtained by appropriation—putting the water 
to beneficial use upon lands.  Once the rights are obtained they vest, 
until abandoned, as appurtenances of the land upon which the water 
has been put to use.  Project water, on the other hand, would not 
exist but for the fact that it has been developed by the United 
States. . . . The terms upon which it can be put to use, and the 
manner in which rights to continued use can be acquired, are for the 
United States to fix.  If such rights are subject to becoming vested 
beyond the power of the United States to take without compensation, 
such vesting can only occur on terms fixed by the United States.40 
 
Irrigators receive Reclamation project water through contracts 
with USBR.41  In most cases, USBR contracts with an organization 
of water users, such as an irrigation district, which in turn delivers 
project water to individual farms.42 The most common type of 
contract is a “repayment contract,” whereby USBR supplies water in 
return for repayment of a portion of the costs of building, 
operating, and maintaining a project.43 USBR also has some “water 
service contracts,” whereby it provides annual water deliveries for a 
specified term of years in return for an agreed rate of payment.44 
Each contract also has a variety of additional provisions, some 
unique to that contract, some common to nearly all contracts.45  
For purposes of this article, one standard term is particularly 
important:  a provision excusing the government from liability if 
for some reason it is unable to deliver a full supply of water under 
the contract.46 
39. Benson, supra note 37, at 370--71. 
40. Israel v. Morton, 549 F.2d 128, 132--33 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Flint v. United States, 
906 F.2d 471, 477 (9th Cir. 1990). 
41. Benson, supra note 37, at 371. 
42. Id. at 371, 393. 
43. Id. at 371. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 393--401. 
46. This type of provision is nearly universal in these contracts, although its wording 
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One important feature of the Reclamation laws is § 8 of the 1902 
Act, which provides that in carrying out the program, the Interior 
Secretary “shall proceed in conformity with” state laws “relating to 
the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in 
irrigation, or any vested rights acquired thereunder . . . .”47  Thus, 
in building, operating, and delivering water from its projects, USBR 
generally must comply with state water laws,48 although states may 
not impose conditions on Reclamation projects that would frustrate 
congressional intent or important federal interests.49 
B. The Endangered Species Act and Section 7 
Enacted in 1973, the ESA is one of America’s best-known and 
most important environmental laws.50  The ESA’s purpose is to 
conserve endangered and threatened species51 and the ecosystems 
on which they depend.52  Although all federal agencies have ESA 
duties, the two most responsible for determining the status and 
needs of imperiled species are the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
(“FWS”) in the Interior Department, and for oceangoing species 
such as salmon, the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) 
within the Department of Commerce53 (together, “the Services”). 
Once a species is listed as threatened or endangered,54 ESA § 955 
varies somewhat from contract to contract.  See, e.g., Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 
67 Fed. Cl. 504, 535 (most Klamath Project contracts involved in that case have such a 
provision); id. at 536 (indicating that some Klamath Projects do not have the provision); id. 
at 536 n.55 (reviewing other cases involving this type of provision in USBR contracts for 
other projects). 
47. 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383. 
48. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 674–75 (1978). 
49. See United States v. Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., 694 F.2d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 
1982). 
50. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 81 Stat. 884 (Dec. 28, 1973). 
51. 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (2000).  The ESA defines an endangered species as one that is “in 
danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range,” id. § 1532(6), while 
a threatened species is one that is “likely to become an endangered species within the 
foreseeable future.” Id. § 1532(20). Through rules issued under section 4(d) of the ESA, id. 
§1533(d), the law typically applies equally to both types of species. 
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000). 
53. NMFS is part of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and is 
sometimes called “NOAA Fisheries.” 
54. ESA § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2000), specifies the process and standards for listing 
species as endangered or threatened.  Listing decisions must be made “solely on the basis of 
the best scientific and commercial data available” to the FWS or, for oceangoing species, the 
NMFS.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2000).  In addition, this section requires designation of 
“critical habitat” for any species at the time it is listed.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3). 
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prohibits “taking” any member of a protected species of fish or 
wildlife.56  This prohibition applies to “any person,”57 and the Act 
defines “person” to include virtually any conceivable entity, 
including a federal agency.58  Under the Act, “‘take’ means to 
harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or 
collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”59  FWS by 
rule has defined “harm” in this context to include “significant 
habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures 
wildlife,”60 thus bringing some habitat destruction on private lands 
within the Act’s prohibition of take.61 
Most important for purposes of this article is § 7,62 which gives 
federal agencies additional duties to protect listed species.63  The 
key provision is § 7(a)(2),64 which commands that every federal 
agency “shall . . . insure that any action authorized, funded, or 
carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the 
continued existence” of any threatened species, or adversely modify 
its designated critical habitat.65 Section 7(a)(2) couples this 
substantive standard of “no jeopardy” with a mandatory process 
55. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2000). 
56. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B). 
57. Id. § 1538(a)(1). 
58. Id. § 1532(13) (2000). 
59. Id. § 1532(19) (2000). 
60. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. 
61. The Supreme Court upheld this rule in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for 
a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).  Under ESA § 10, the Services may issue an incidental 
take permit to a non-federal entity, allowing legalized “take” of protected species where the 
take would be “incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful 
activity.”  16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2000).  The applicant for such an incidental take permit must 
submit a conservation plan, better known as a habitat conservation plan or HCP, describing 
(among other things) the applicant’s steps to mitigate or minimize take and the funding 
available for these efforts.  16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A) (2000). 
62. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2000). 
63. A federal agency action may incidentally result in take of a member of a listed species, 
but if the agency has followed the requirements of § 7 with respect to that action, it may 
receive an “incidental take statement” from the relevant Service that essentially authorizes a 
certain level of take in connection with that action.  See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine 
Fisheries Serv., 422 F.3d 782, 790 (9th Cir. 2005). 
64. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).  In addition, § 7(a)(1) directs all agencies affirmatively to use 
their existing authorities to conserve listed species, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1), although courts 
have rarely found an agency to have fallen short of this requirement.  See J.B. Ruhl, Section 
7(a)(1) of the “New” Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering and Redefining the Untapped Power of 
Federal Agencies’ Duty to Conserve Species, 25 ENVTL. L. 1107, 1126--1137 (1995), and cases cited 
therein.  But see Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 1998). 
65. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). 
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known as “consultation.”66 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
explained the consultation triggers and process as follows: 
 
In order to ensure compliance with the Act, the ESA and its 
implementing regulations require federal agencies (“action 
agencies”) to consult with the appropriate federal fish and wildlife 
agency . . . whenever their actions “may affect” an endangered or 
threatened species.  Thus, if the agency determines that a particular 
action will have no effect on an endangered or threatened species, 
the consultation requirements are not triggered. If the action agency 
subsequently determines that its action is “likely to adversely affect” a 
protected species, it must engage in formal consultation.  Formal 
consultation requires that the consulting agency . . . issue a biological 
opinion determining whether the action is likely to jeopardize the 
listed species and describing, if necessary, reasonable and prudent 
alternatives that will avoid a likelihood of jeopardy.  But if the action 
agency determines that an action is “not likely to adversely affect” the 
species, it may attempt informal consultation.  This does not end the 
consultation process.  The consulting agency must issue a written 
concurrence in the determination or may suggest modifications that 
the action agency could take to avoid the likelihood of adverse effects 
to the listed species.  If no such concurrence is reached, the 
regulations require that formal consultation be undertaken.67 
 
If the Service determines that the proposed action may 
jeopardize the species, it must suggest “reasonable and prudent 
alternatives” to avoid jeopardy while meeting the purposes of the 
proposal.68  If the agency wants to proceed with the proposed 
action despite a biological opinion (“BO”) finding that the 
proposed action might jeopardize the species, the agency may seek 
an exemption from the cabinet-level Endangered Species 
Committee.69 The agency must not proceed with the proposed 
action until consultation is completed.70 
66. Id. 
67. Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1054 n.8 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations 
omitted). 
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(b)(3)(A) (2000). 
69. Id. § 1532(e) (2000) specifies the membership, standards and procedures of the 
Committee, which is better known as the “God Squad.” 
70. “After initiation of consultation . . . the Federal agency and the permit or license 
applicant shall not make any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources with 
respect to the agency action which would have the effect of foreclosing the formulation or 
implementation of any reasonable and prudent alternative measures which would not violate 
subsection 7(a)(2) of this section.”  16 U.S.C. § 1532(d). 
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Federal courts, especially the Ninth Circuit, have emphasized the 
importance of federal agency compliance with the ESA’s 
procedural requirements.  Section 7 provides for “a systematic 
determination of the effects of a federal project on endangered 
species.  If a project is allowed to proceed without substantial 
compliance with those procedural requirements, there can be no 
assurance that a violation of the ESA’s substantive provisions [i.e. 
the jeopardy prohibition] will not result.  The latter, of course, is 
impermissible.”71 
C. USBR’s Duties under the Endangered Species Act 
Several cases in recent years have defined USBR’s responsibilities 
under ESA § 7.  Through these cases, federal courts (primarily the 
Ninth Circuit) have clarified that USBR must comply with § 7 when 
its contracting activities or project operations may affect listed 
species.  In NRDC v. Houston,72 environmental plaintiffs challenged 
the agency’s failure to consult before renewing water service 
contracts with irrigators on the Central Valley Project (“CVP”) in 
California.73  The Ninth Circuit held that USBR violated its               
§ 7(a)(2) duties by failing to request consultation with NMFS over 
the effects of contract renewals on salmon protected by the ESA,74 
and upheld the district court’s decision to rescind the renewed 
contracts pending the completion of consultation.75 
Courts also have held that § 7 requires USBR to consult on the 
operations of existing projects where water deliveries may adversely 
affect species protected by the ESA.  Perhaps the most significant 
case on this point is Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations 
v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, where the district court held that 
USBR violated its § 7 duties by not completing consultation on its 
Klamath Project operations for the year 2000,76 and essentially 
71. Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 764 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 
153, 184--93 (1978)). 
72. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 1998). 
73. USBR had renewed fourteen water service contracts with irrigation districts and other 
water user organizations, each for a forty-year period, on terms similar to those of the 
original contracts.  See id. at 1123--24. 
74. Id. at 1126--29 (“The Bureau had an affirmative duty to ensure that its actions did not 
jeopardize endangered species, and the NMFS letter clearly disagreed with the agency’s 
determination of no adverse impact.”). 
75. Id. at 1129. 
76. 138 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1247 (N.D. Cal. 2001).  The court took a particularly dim view 
of USBR’s failure to consult on its 2000 operations, given that the agency had consulted in 
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enjoined project water deliveries until consultation was completed 
for 2001.77  That consultation, in conjunction with an extreme 
drought, resulted in a severe cutback in water deliveries to project 
irrigators, leading to the 2001 “water crisis” in the Klamath Basin.78 
The Ninth Circuit has stated that USBR’s duties under § 7(a)(2) 
take priority over its contractual commitments to project water 
users.  In a case involving USBR obligations under both the ESA 
and the Central Valley Project Improvement Act,79 the court 
rejected arguments by water users that USBR breached its contracts 
by reducing water deliveries during certain dry years.80  
Additionally, in a case involving operational control of the Klamath 
Project, the Ninth Circuit stated flatly that USBR’s responsibilities 
under the ESA “override the water rights of the Irrigators.”81  
Within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit, at least, USBR clearly 
must operate its projects to avoid jeopardy even if that means 
cutting water deliveries for irrigation and other contracted uses.82 
Some water users whose deliveries have been reduced because of 
operating restrictions imposed on Reclamation projects under § 7 
have sued the government for damages, claiming a temporary 
“taking” of their water rights requiring compensation.  In Tulare 
Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States, irrigators argued that 
ESA restrictions on CVP operations took their water rights by 
reducing their deliveries from the California State Water Project, 
which operates in coordination with the federal CVP.83  The Court 
previous years and seemingly recognized the need to consult.  Id. at 1244--45.  The court 
insinuated that the agency may have acted in bad faith by failing to move forward with the 
consultation process in 2000.  Id. at 1246. 
77. Pending completion of consultation, the court required USBR to ensure specified 
Klamath River flows before delivering any project water for irrigation.  Id. at 1250. 
78. For an account of the factors underlying the Klamath Basin dispute and the events 
leading up to the 2001 crisis, see Benson, supra note 25, at 214–28. 
79. The CVPIA requires USBR to dedicate 800,000 acre-feet of CVP water per year to fish 
and wildlife restoration.  See Cent. Delta Water Agency v. Bureau of Reclamation, 452 F.3d 
1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 2006). 
80. O’Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 687 (9th Cir. 1995). 
81. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 
1999).  The case focused on whether USBR and the utility Pacificorp had acted properly in 
modifying their contract for control of a Klamath Project Dam, where the modification had 
the effect of benefiting listed species but increasing risks to irrigators. 
82. See Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426 F.3d 
1082, 1094 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting flows provided for listed salmon in first eight years of 
USBR ten-year operating plan for the Klamath Project as insufficient to meet ESA 
obligations). 
83. 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 314 (2001). 
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of Federal Claims agreed, holding that the government was 
required to compensate the irrigators for water they did not receive 
in the years 1992–1994.84 
The successful Tulare plaintiffs had water delivery contracts with 
the State of California,85 but irrigators who receive water from 
federal projects under contracts with USBR have not yet fared so 
well in asserting that ESA restrictions have taken their water 
rights.86  In a case from the CVP, the Court of Federal Claims found 
no taking after a full trial, based on its analysis of the statutes, 
contracts, and facts specific to that case.87  The Court of Federal 
Claims reached the same result on very different grounds in a case 
from the Klamath Project, holding first that the irrigators could 
pursue their claims only for breach of contract and not for taking 
of property rights,88 and later rejecting the contract claims because 
the enactment of the ESA was a sovereign act which could not give 
rise to contractual liability for the government.89 
In certain cases, however, courts have been faced with the 
threshold question of whether pre-ESA legal obligations require 
USBR to operate its projects in a way that essentially leaves no room 
to consider the needs of listed species.90  This issue has been hotly 
contested in the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow litigation discussed 
below,91 with no final resolution as of this writing.  The existence or 
absence of discretion is a key question because of an ESA 
84. Id. at 319. 
85. The facts in Tulare were somewhat unique, in that the plaintiffs were affected by ESA 
restrictions on a federal water project but their contracts were with the State of California.  
See Melinda Harm Benson, The Tulare Case: Water Rights, the Endangered Species Act, and the 
Fifth Amendment, 32 ENVTL. L. 551, 554–55 (2002).  Thus, the irrigators in Tulare did not have 
to overcome a common provision in USBR contracts which excuses the federal government 
from liability for failure to deliver a full water supply.  49 Fed. Cl. at 321. 
86. In a recent case from the Court of Federal Claims, Judge Wiese—who decided 
Tulare—held that ESA restrictions on water deliveries from Reclamation projects must be 
analyzed as regulatory (not physical) takings, essentially repudiating a crucial element of the 
Tulare takings analysis.  Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 100, 106 (2007). 
87. Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 321, 324 (2007).  Earlier, the 
Court had denied summary judgment, identifying a number of disputed factual issues.  70 
Fed. Cl. 515 (2006). 
88. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed.Cl. 504, 540 (2005). 
89. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 677, 685, 695 (2007). 
90. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 1998) (USBR has 
discretion in renewing CVP water service contracts); Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 257    
F. Supp. 2d 53 (USBR has no discretion to operate its projects on the Lower Colorado River 
for the benefit of species existing solely in Mexico). 
91. See infra Part IV.A. 
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implementing rule that limits the applicability of § 7 to 
discretionary agency actions.  The following section of this article 
examines this rule and Ninth Circuit cases applying it to various 
federal activities. 
II. THE “DISCRETIONARY FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT OR CONTROL” 
TRIGGER FOR ESA SECTION 7 
A. The “Discretionary” Rule and its Context 
ESA § 7(a)(2) requires each federal agency92 to “insure that any 
action authorized, funded, or carried out” by the agency is not 
likely to cause jeopardy to a listed species or adversely affect a 
designated critical habitat.93  The statute does not define which (if 
any) federal activities are not subject to this mandate.94  The 
definition of “action” in the ESA implementing regulations sheds 
little additional light on the subject,95 but does offer a general list 
of examples.
Since 1986, however, ESA implementing rules have contained an 
important limitation, codified at 50 C.F.R. § 402.03:  “Section 7 and 
the requirements of this Part apply to all actions in which there is 
discretionary federal involvement or control.”97  Here, again, the 
rules provide no definition or other language to explain 
“discretionary federal involvement or control.”  Nor does the 
statute define the terms “discretion” or “discretionary”; to the 
contrary, neither term even appears in § 7 or in § 3,98 which 
92. This term means “any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States.”  
16 U.S.C. § 1532(7) (2000). 
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). 
94. The ESA defines “Federal agency” broadly, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(7), but does not define 
“insure,” “action,” “authorized,” “funded,” or “carried out.” 
95. “‘Action’ means all activities or programs of any kind authorized, funded, or carried 
out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies in the United States or on the high seas.”  50 
C.F.R. § 402.02. 
96. According to this non-exclusive list, a federal agency would engage in “action” if it 
promulgated rules, issued a permit or license, entered into a contract or lease, granted an 
easement or right-of-way, or otherwise did something “directly or indirectly causing 
modifications to the land, water, or air.”  Id. 
97. 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 contains only this single sentence. 
98. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536, 1532.  Black’s Law Dictionary (8th  ed. 2004) defines “discretion” 
to mean “Individual judgment; the power of free decision-making,” and “administrative 
discretion” to mean “[a] public official’s or agency’s power to exercise judgment in the 
discharge of its duties.” 
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contains the ESA’s definitions. 
Prior to 1986, 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 did not contain the word 
“discretionary.”99  When the Departments of Interior and 
Commerce jointly proposed to revise the rules governing 
implementation of ESA § 7 in 1983,100 the agencies proposed that   
§ 7 would apply to “all actions in which there is federal involvement 
or control,”101 as provided by the then-existing rules.102  In finalizing 
the rules, however, the agencies added “discretionary” to the text of 
§ 402.03.103  The final rulemaking notice is strangely silent on this 
point.104 
Thus, even though § 402.03 has included the “discretionary 
Federal involvement or control” language for over twenty years, the 
meaning of this phrase has not been very clear—not only because 
the 1986 rulemaking failed to define the word “discretionary” or 
explain its insertion, but also because that term has no apparent 
basis in the ESA itself.105  It is therefore not surprising that courts 
have struggled, with somewhat mixed results, to decide whether a 
particular federal agency action is “discretionary” and therefore 
subject to the requirements of § 7. 
B. Ninth Circuit Cases Interpreting the “Discretionary” Rule 
Since 1995, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted   
99. See 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926 (June 3, 1986) (final rulemaking notice). 
100. 48 Fed. Reg. 29,990 (June 29, 1983). 
101. Id. at 29,999. 
102. See Derek Weller, Limiting the Scope of the Endangered Species Act: Discretionary Federal 
Involvement or Control under Section 402.03, 5 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 309, 323 
(1999). 
103. 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,958 (June 3, 1986). 
104. Id. at 19,937 (explaining § 402.03 generally but never addressing the addition of 
“discretionary”).  In his dissent in NAHB, Justice Stevens argued that because the agencies 
had failed to explain the new word in their final rulemaking notice, they must not have 
intended the change to have legal significance: “Clearly, if the Secretary of the Interior 
meant to limit the pre-existing understanding of the scope of the coverage of § 7(a)(2) by 
promulgating this regulation, that intent would have been mentioned somewhere in the text 
of the regulations or in contemporaneous comment about them.”  Nat’l Ass’n of Home 
Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2542 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(citations omitted). 
105. By contrast, there is at least some statutory basis for the ESA implementing rules’ 
requirement that a “reasonable and prudent alternative” be one that can be “implemented 
consistent with the scope of the Federal agency’s legal authority and jurisdiction.”  50 C.F.R. 
§ 402.02.  Under § 7, if the Secretary issues a jeopardy opinion, he “shall suggest those 
reasonable and prudent alternatives which . . . can be taken by the Federal agency or applicant in 
implementing the agency action.”  16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). 
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§ 402.03 to exempt certain federal activities from § 7 
requirements.106  In Sierra Club v. Babbitt (Seneca), the Bureau of 
Land Management (“BLM”) had authorized a logging company to 
build a road across BLM lands, even though an agency biologist 
had determined that the proposed logging road could adversely 
affect the northern spotted owl.107  BLM believed it was required to 
approve the road under a 1962 right-of-way agreement, under 
which Seneca Sawmill could proceed with the road within thirty 
days of giving notice to BLM unless the agency notified the 
company that the proposed road did not satisfy one of three 
specified criteria.108  Environmental groups sued the Interior 
Department for approving the road without consultation under § 7 
and the agency argued that no consultation was needed because it 
lacked the authority “to influence Seneca’s actions for the benefit 
of the threatened spotted owl.”109  The government contended that 
it had no authority to stop or alter the road for any reason except 
the three specified in the 1962 agreement, even though BLM and 
Seneca had entered into a 1991 stipulation whereby the company 
agreed to conform its operations to all applicable state and federal 
environmental standards.110  A divided panel held that no 
consultation was required, citing § 402.03 and deferring to the 
Regional Interior Solicitor’s determination of the agency’s 
authority.111  The majority concluded: 
 
 
[T]he right-of-way agreement was granted prior to the enactment of 
the ESA and there is no further action relevant to the spotted owl that 
the BLM can take prior to Seneca’s exercise of their contractual 
106. The Ninth Circuit is not the only court that has applied § 402.03 in determining an 
agency’s duty to consult.  See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 257 F. Supp. 2d 53 
(D.D.C. 2003), discussed infra at note 268.  This article focuses on the Ninth Circuit because 
it is the venue for so much ESA litigation, giving it a better developed body of caselaw on this 
issue than other courts. 
107. 65 F.3d 1502, 1506–07 (9th Cir. 1995). 
108. Under the agreement, BLM could notify the company that the proposed route for 
the road was not the most direct, that the road would substantially interfere with existing or 
planned facilities, or that it would result in excessive soil erosion.  Id. at 1505. 
109. Id. at 1508.  More specifically, BLM argued that the 1962 right-of-way agreement was 
the relevant action, and that approving the road under that agreement was not an agency 
action within the meaning of § 7.  Id. at 1507. 
110. This stipulation gave BLM the right to halt construction or other operations if the 
company were to violate any of the standards covered in the stipulation.  Id. at 1506. 
111. Id. at 1509. 
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rights. . . . [W]here, as here, the federal agency lacks the discretion to 
influence the private action, consultation would be a meaningless 
exercise; the agency simply does not possess the ability to implement 
measures that inure to the benefit of the species.112 
 
The court’s decision in EPIC v. Simpson Timber Co. was quite 
similar to the Seneca case in many respects, although it dealt with a 
federal agency’s duty to reinitiate consultation under an existing 
permit.113  If an agency has already consulted on an ongoing 
activity, the agency must reinitiate consultation if the activity is 
having unexpected impacts on listed species or if a new species is 
listed that may be affected by the activity.114  However, the rules 
provide for reinitiating consultation if “discretionary Federal 
involvement or control over the action has been retained or is 
authorized by law.”115  The EPIC plaintiffs argued that FWS was 
required to re-consult on the Incidental Take Permit that it had 
issued Simpson Timber years earlier, because new species had been 
listed in the area covered by the permit.116  The key issue was 
whether FWS had discretionary involvement or control under the 
existing permit.  The majority felt that for this standard to be met, 
“the permit must reserve to the FWS discretion to act to protect 
species in addition to the northern spotted owl.”117  One provision 
seemed to confer exactly this kind of discretion:  a commitment by 
Simpson to submit logging plans that would not only address the 
specific needs of the spotted owl, but also “modify silvicultural 
systems as appropriate to ensure compatibility with the habitat 
requirements of other species found within Simpson’s ownership 
that are considered sensitive by state and federal agencies.”118  The 
majority somehow read this language as protecting only species 
112. Id. (emphasis in original).  Judge Pregerson dissented, arguing that the Court was 
too quick to grant deference to the agency’s determination of its own authority, and that 
BLM did retain adequate discretion over the road approval to trigger the requirements of     
§ 7.  Id. at 1513–14 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
113. EPIC v. Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2001). 
114. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16. 
115. Id. 
116. EPIC, 255 F.3d at 1076 (noting that the permit addressed only the northern spotted 
owl when it was issued in the early 1990s, and that since then the marbled murrelet and the 
coho salmon had been listed in the area of Simpson’s lands).  An incidental take permit 
authorizes take by a non-federal entity under certain circumstances and subject to certain 
conditions.  See supra note 61. 
117. EPIC, 255 F.3d at 1081 n.6. 
118. See id. at 1080–81. 
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(other than the owl) actually listed under the ESA at the time of 
the permit.119  Finding no permit provision that gave FWS the 
requisite discretion,120 the court held that the agency had no duty 
to reinitiate consultation.121
A few Ninth Circuit cases under § 402.03 are best understood as 
involving no federal agency action—that is, no program or activity 
authorized, funded or carried out by a federal agency122—rather 
than an absence of agency discretion.  The first such case was 
Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, in which plaintiffs challenged FWS’s 
failure to consult on the issuance of certain letters pertaining to 
timber companies’ proposed salvage logging on company lands.123  
This proposed logging was governed under California state statutes 
and rules administered by the California Department of Forestry 
and Fire Protection (“CDF”).124  The court held that CDF had 
regulatory authority over the companies’ logging plans, and that 
the federal agency role was solely advisory.125  Although the court 
indicated at one point that FWS had no duty to consult because it 
119. Id. at 1081.  The court offered no support for reading “sensitive” to mean 
“threatened or endangered,” despite the fact that the two designations have very different 
meanings and different legal consequences. 
120. In dissent, Judge D.W. Nelson argued that various provisions of the Simpson permit 
and  FWS’ permitting rules, provided more than adequate discretion to trigger § 7, and 
criticized the majority’s “new requirement that the agency explicitly reserve the right to 
implement measures to protect new species in the permit.”  Id. at 1083--85 (D.W. Nelson, J., 
dissenting). 
121. In another case applying § 402.03, the Ninth Circuit held that the Navy was not 
required to consult on the potential effects of a program to retrofit submarines with a new 
class of nuclear missiles at a base in Washington, because a Presidential order required the 
Navy to carry out the program at that base.  “[A]ny consultation by the Navy with NMFS 
regarding the risks of accidental Trident II explosion on the threatened salmon species, if 
such risks arise solely from the President’s siting decision, would be an exercise in futility.”  
Ground Zero Ctr. for Non-Violent Action v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 383 F.3d 1082, 1092 (9th 
Cir. 2004).  The opinion deals primarily with environmental review requirements under the 
National Environmental Policy Act, and provides a rather cursory analysis of the discretion 
issue under the ESA. 
122. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000), 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (definition of “action”). 
123. Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 1996). 
124. Id. at 1071--72. 
125. The court concluded that  
 
[FWS] merely provided advice on how the Lumber Companies could avoid a take under 
section 9 of the ESA.  Protection of endangered species would not be enhanced by a 
rule which would require a federal agency to perform the burdensome procedural tasks 
mandated by section 7 simply because it advised or consulted with a private party. 
   
Id. at 1074. 
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lacked discretion,126 it really meant that the agency exercised no 
control over the activity and therefore took no “action” for 
purposes of § 7.127 
Like the Marbled Murrelet case, two of the Ninth Circuit’s most 
recent decisions regarding the applicability of § 7 are best 
explained by a lack of agency action.  In Western Watersheds Project v. 
Matejko, the court held that BLM was not required to consult on 
long-established rights-of-way for water diversions crossing its 
lands.128  And in California Sportfishing Protection Alliance v. Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, the court upheld FERC’s refusal to 
initiate consultation on an existing hydropower project license, 
even though the project was apparently affecting listed salmon.129  
The license contained a provision allowing FERC to order 
modifications for the protection of fish.130  The agency, however, 
chose not to initiate consultation, arguing that the license was set 
to expire in four years and that early consultation had already 
begun on the renewal.  The court held that “the reopener 
provisions do no more than give the agency discretion to decide 
whether to exercise discretion,” and because FERC had taken no 
action regarding the project since issuing a license in 1980, it was 
not required to consult.131  Thus, California Sportfishing means that 
even where an agency clearly possesses discretionary power, it has 
no duty to consult unless and until it actually authorizes, funds, or 
126. The court stated, e.g,, “When an agency lacks the discretion to influence the private 
action there is no agency action.”  Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Babbitt (Seneca), 65 F.3d 1502, 
1509 (9th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotations omitted). 
127. The court noted correctly that § 7 covers any action authorized, funded, or carried 
out by a federal agency, but then incorrectly stated that “an action is an agency action if 
there is discretionary Federal involvement or control.”  Id. at 1073 (citing Seneca, 65 F.3d at 
1509) (internal quotations omitted).  The court thus mistook “discretionary involvement or 
control” as the test for whether there is an agency action, rather than the test for whether an 
agency action is subject to § 7.  But the court clearly based its decision on the fact that the 
FWS had no authority over private logging except for its ability to enforce the “take” 
prohibition of ESA § 9, and that latent authority did not amount to an agency action.  Id. at 
1074. 
128. 468 F.3d 1099, 1108 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[E]ven assuming the BLM could have had 
some type of discretion here to regulate the diversions (beyond a substantial deviation [from 
the use authorized in the existing right-of-way]), the existence of such discretion without 
more is not an action triggering a consultation duty.”). 
129. 472 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2006). 
130. “The Licensee shall, for the conservation and development of fish and wildlife 
resources, construct, maintain, and operate . . . such reasonable modifications of project 
structures and operation, as may be ordered by [FERC] . . . .”  Id. 
131. Id. at 599. 
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carries out some activity. 
Arguments against the applicability of § 7 have not always 
prevailed, however.  In National Resources Defense Council v. Houston, 
plaintiffs argued that USBR was required to consult before 
renewing certain irrigation districts’ forty-year contracts for water 
service from the CVP.132  The districts argued that USBR had no 
discretion to change the terms of the contracts in renewing them, 
and in particular the quantity of water in the contracts.133  Federal 
attorneys opined that the USBR had no discretion to change the 
quantity of water, but plenty of discretion to alter other contract 
terms.134  The court, however, found statutory discretion for USBR 
to alter even the quantity of water in the renewed contracts:  “The 
federal reclamation laws, which provided the right to renewal, state 
that the government is to renew the contracts on ‘mutually 
agreeable’ terms [and] that water rights are based on the amount 
of available project water . . . .”135  It further suggested that a 
project’s available water supply could legally be reduced in order to 
meet ESA requirements.136  The court concluded that even if the 
original contracts guaranteed a fixed quantity of water on renewal, 
USBR had discretion to alter other contract provisions, and “may 
be able to reduce the amount of water available for sale if necessary 
to comply with ESA.”137  Thus, the agency was required by § 7 to 
complete consultation before renewing the contracts. 
Turtle Island Restoration Network v. National Marine Fisheries Service 
involved NMFS’ issuance of permits for longline fishing vessels to 
operate off the Pacific coast.138  Plaintiffs alleged that these 
operations harmed sea turtles protected by the ESA, and that the 
agency was required to consult before permitting them.  NMFS 
argued that the High Seas Fishing Compliance Act139 gave the 
agency no discretion to impose permit conditions for the benefit of 
132. 146 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 1998). 
133. The districts raised this issue for the first time on appeal, id. at 1125 n.3, but 
apparently the federal government did not participate in this appeal.  Id. at 1124 n.2, 1125. 
134. The government believed it could not change the quantity because of a federal 
statute, 43 U.S.C. § 485h-1, giving the districts “a first right . . . to a stated share or quantity of 
the project’s water supply.”  Id. at 1126 (quoting Interior Solicitor’s opinion). 
135. Id. at 1126 (citations omitted). 
136. Id. (citing O’Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 686 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
137. Id. 
138. 340 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2003). 
139. 16 U.S.C. §§ 5501--09 (2000). 
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sea turtles,140 and the district court agreed.141  The appeals court, 
however, held that the statute clearly gave NMFS broad authority to 
impose conditions in permitting longline vessels,142 including 
conditions that would benefit sea turtles.143  The appeals court 
concluded that because the statute gave NMFS discretion “so that 
the agency could condition permits to benefit listed species,” 
consultation was required.144 
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the agency’s “no discretion” 
argument in Washington Toxics Coalition v. EPA,145 involving EPA’s 
duty to consult on the impacts of pesticides registered by the 
agency under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide 
Act (“FIFRA”).146  Plaintiffs introduced evidence that at least fifty-
four registered pesticides were harming salmon protected by the 
ESA, but EPA argued that FIFRA left it no discretion to consult on 
the effects of products that it had already approved.  The court 
held that the agency had independent duties under the ESA 
regardless of whether it was fully complying with FIFRA.147  In 
addition, the Ninth Circuit found discretion in FIFRA that would 
allow EPA to consider the effects of an approved pesticide on listed 
species:  “Pesticide registrations under FIFRA are ongoing and have 
long-lasting effects even after adoption.  EPA retains discretion to 
alter the registration of pesticides for reasons that include 
environmental concerns.  Therefore, EPA’s regulatory discretion is 
not limited by FIFRA in any way” that would preclude application 
of ESA § 7 to registered pesticides.148 
140. Turtle Island, 340 F.3d at 972. 
141. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Service, No. C-01-1706, 2001 
WL 1602707 (N.D. Cal., Nov. 28, 2001). 
142. The court emphasized language in the statute giving the agency authority to impose 
conditions “necessary and appropriate to carry out the obligations of the United States under 
the Agreement, including but not limited to the markings of the boat and reporting 
requirements.”  Turtle Island, 340 F.3d at 976 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 5503(d)) (emphasis added 
by court).  The “Agreement” is the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International 
Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas.  See id. at 975--
76 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 5501). 
143. The court held that the statute was unambiguous on this point, and that the court 
therefore would not defer to NMFS’ interpretation that it lacked discretion to condition 
permits for turtle protection.  Id. at 976. 
144. Id. at 977 (emphasis in original). 
145.  Washington Toxics Coalition v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2005). 
146. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2000). 
147. Washington Toxics, 413 F.3d 1024, 1030--32.  This aspect of the court’s opinion is no 
longer good law after the Supreme Court’s NAHB decision, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2536 (2007). 
148. Washington Toxics, 413 F.3d 1024, 1033 (citations omitted).  Thus, the court 
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A few general points emerge from this line of cases on 
discretionary action.  First, the court has determined discretion by 
parsing the language of the statutes, rules, and permits most 
directly involved in disputes, with somewhat unpredictable results.  
For example, the EPIC majority found no discretionary power to 
protect species beyond the spotted owl despite a permit term that 
seemed to provide that power clearly,149 whereas the Turtle Island 
court found unambiguous authority to protect sea turtles from a 
catchall provision of a statutory section dealing primarily with 
fishing boat markings and reporting requirements.150  Second, the 
court has found no discretion in cases where a person has an 
existing permit or approval, and a federal agency either has little or 
no authority to require changes (e.g. Seneca), or has latent 
discretionary authority but no legal duty to exercise it (e.g. 
California Sportfishing).  Third, all of the Ninth Circuit cases have 
involved an existing or new federal license151 or agreement 
involving private activity, and none has involved a federal agency 
claiming an absence of discretion in implementing its own land 
management program or operating its own project. 
Given the importance of the question of § 7’s applicability and 
the number of Ninth Circuit decisions on this issue, it is not 
surprising that one of these cases would eventually land in the 
Supreme Court.  Ironically, perhaps, the dispute that brought         
§ 402.03 to the nation’s highest court involved another powerful 
environmental statute:  the Clean Water Act. 
III. THE NAHB CASE: THE SUPREME COURT INTERPRETS THE 
“DISCRETIONARY” TRIGGER 
A. The Dispute and the Ninth Circuit Decision 
In 2002, Arizona asked the EPA to delegate authority to the 
Arizona Department of Environmental Quality (“ADEQ”) to issue 
permits under CWA § 402 for pollution discharges within the state.  
In the recent past, EPA had consulted under ESA § 7 before 
distinguished its earlier decisions in Seneca and Simpson Timber. 
149. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
150. See infra note 151 and accompanying text. 
151. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(8) (2000) (Administrative Procedure Act definition of “license” as 
including “an agency permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter, membership, 
statutory exemption or other form of permission”). 
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delegating § 402 permitting authority to states.152  This time, 
however, EPA took the position that it had no discretionary 
authority to consider endangered species impacts in deciding on 
Arizona’s application.  Thus, despite concerns expressed by FWS 
staff over potential impacts on listed species that might result from 
delegating the permitting program to ADEQ, EPA maintained that 
consultation was inappropriate.153  The issue was elevated to EPA 
and FWS headquarters, and eventually FWS agreed that although 
listed species may lose protection when a state takes over § 402 
permitting from EPA, this effect results from the requirements of   
§ 402 itself, not from EPA’s delegation decision.154  In the end, FWS 
issued a BO that essentially adopted EPA’s view of the effect of the 
delegation language of § 402, and EPA then approved Arizona’s 
request.155 
Environmental plaintiffs challenged EPA’s decision, arguing that 
the agency had violated the ESA by delegating § 402 permitting to 
ADEQ without adequately considering impacts to listed species.156  
In Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, a divided Ninth Circuit panel held 
that EPA did indeed have discretionary authority to consider 
endangered species impacts in making delegation decisions under 
§ 402.157  In reaching this decision, the court stated that ESA § 7 
itself provided an independent grant of authority to protect 
species, “beyond that conferred by agencies’ own governing 
statutes.”158  The court also read the “discretionary involvement or 
152. Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 420 F.3d 946, 952 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 
2518 (2007) (“Every pollution permitting transfer decision since 1993 has involved some 
form of EPA consultation with FWS regarding endangered species.”). 
153. Essentially, FWS expressed concerns that listed species might lose protection 
because ADEQ might begin issuing permits without conditions to protect listed species, 
contrary to EPA’s recent practice.  The species involved included the southwestern willow 
flycatcher, two plant species, and others.  Id. at 952. 
154. Id. at 953--54 (quoting from FWS BO on EPA’s decision regarding the Arizona 
application). 
155. Id. at 954--55, citing 67 Fed. Reg. 79,629 (Dec. 30, 2002) (delegating § 402 program 
to Arizona). 
156. Plaintiffs also argued under the Administrative Procedure Act that EPA’s decision 
was arbitrary and capricious.  In addition, they filed a separate suit challenging FWS’ BO on 
the delegation, and the two cases were eventually consolidated.  Id. at 955. 
157. The court noted, as a threshold matter, that an agency must have some authority to 
take measures to prevent harm to listed species; otherwise, the agency would be forced to 
choose between violating the prohibitions of ESA § 7 and acting beyond their legal power.  
Id. at 964. 
158. Id.  The court reached this conclusion based on its reading of TVA v. Hill (see supra 
notes 1--8 and accompanying text), as well as its analysis of ESA text and legislative history.  
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control” language of 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 as adding nothing to the 
statutory language, by which § 7(a)(2) applies to actions 
authorized, funded or carried out by a federal agency.159  Based on 
this reading of the rule, the question for the court was whether 
EPA’s delegation decision was an agency action, not whether CWA 
§ 402 itself left EPA any discretion to consider listed species in 
making that decision.160  The majority concluded that the 
delegation decision was a federal agency action triggering § 7 
requirements, and that the “EPA may have complied with its 
obligations under the Clean Water Act, but compliance with a 
complementary statute cannot relieve the EPA of its independent 
obligations under section 7(a)(2).”161 
B. The Supreme Court Decision 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and upheld the 
government’s position regarding its discretionary authority.  The 
Court began by noting that CWA § 402 dictates that EPA “shall 
approve” a transfer application that satisfies all nine statutory 
requirements: “the statutory language is mandatory and the list 
exclusive; if the nine specified criteria are satisfied, the EPA does 
not have the discretion to deny a transfer application.”162  The 
Court then noted that the ESA also imposes a mandatory duty on 
federal agencies, and it characterized the “no jeopardy” command 
of § 7(a)(2) as adding an additional criterion to the existing list in 
§ 402.163  Framing the issue as an “implied repeal” of § 402 by the 
later-enacted ESA, the Court noted that implied repeals are not 
The court rejected the reasoning of cases from other courts which had reached the contrary 
conclusion about the ESA as an independent source of authority to protect species, finding 
that these cases “do not reflect a full consideration of the text and history of section 7(a)(2).”  
Id. at 970. 
159. Id. at 967. 
160. In reaching this result, the court characterized its earlier cases involving § 402.03 as 
interpreting that rule to be “coterminous” with ESA § 7(a)(2).  Id. at 969. 
161. Id. at 971.  In dissent, Judge Thompson disagreed that EPA had discretionary 
authority, and argued that earlier Ninth Circuit decisions supported that position.  Id. at 979, 
980 (Thompson, J., dissenting).  The dissent took the position that in deciding on Arizona’s 
application, EPA could consider only the nine factors specified in CWA § 402, and that 
consultation would be an additional requirement inconsistent with the agency’s mandatory 
duties under the Clean Water Act.  Id. at 980. 
162. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2531 (2007) 
(citations omitted). 
163. Id. at 2532 (citing Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 450 F.3d 394, 404 n.2 (9th Cir. 
2006) (Berzon, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc)). 
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favored, and it expressed concern that a literal reading of § 7(a)(2) 
would “partially override every federal statute mandating agency 
action . . . .”164  The Court spun this potential conflict between the 
ESA and other statutes into a “fundamental ambiguity” in the 
language of § 7(a)(2),165 and applied Chevron deference166 to the 
rule providing that § 7 applies to agency actions where there is 
“discretionary federal involvement or control.”167  Having thus 
validated 50 C.F.R. § 402.03, the Court then interpreted the rule 
more broadly than the Ninth Circuit had below:168  “§ 7(a)(2)’s no-
jeopardy duty covers only discretionary agency actions and does not 
attach to actions (like the [§ 402] permitting transfer 
authorization) that the agency is required by statute to undertake 
once certain specified triggering events have occurred.”169 
In reaching this interpretation of § 7(a)(2), the Court had to 
minimize the effect of its strongly worded opinion in TVA v. Hill.170  
The majority acknowledged that in the snail darter case, the Court 
had “concluded that ‘the ordinary meaning’ of § 7 of the ESA 
contained ‘no exemptions’ and reflected a ‘conscious decision by 
Congress to give endangered species priority over the ‘primary 
164. Id. at 2532--33. 
165. As stated by the majority, 
 
We must therefore read § 7(a)(2) of the ESA against the statutory backdrop of the many 
mandatory agency directives whose operation it would implicitly abrogate or repeal if it 
were construed as broadly as the Ninth Circuit did below.  When § 7(a)(2) is read this 
way, we are left with a fundamental ambiguity that is not resolved by the statutory text.  
An agency cannot simultaneously obey the differing mandates set forth in § 7(a)(2) of 
the ESA and § 402(b) of the CWA, and consequently the statutory language—read in 
light of the canon against implied repeals—does not itself give clear guidance as to 
which command must give way. 
 
Id. at 2534. 
166. Under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), unless 
Congress has clearly expressed its intent on the specific issue before the agency, a reviewing 
court will defer to an agency’s “reasonable” interpretation of a statute it is responsible for 
implementing. 
167. NAHB, 127 S. Ct. at 2534.  The Court deemed it reasonable to interpret § 7(a)(2) as 
applying only to discretionary actions, because  “when an agency is required to do something 
by statute, it simply lacks the power to ‘insure’ that such action will not jeopardize 
endangered species.”  Id. at 2534--35 (emphasis in original). 
168. Id. at 2535 (rejecting the Ninth’s Circuit’s interpretation of § 402.03, whereby the 
rule was “congruent with the statutory reference to actions ‘authorized, funded, or carried 
out’ by the agency,” and citing 420 F.3d 946, 968). 
169. Id. at 2536 (emphasis in original). 
170. See supra notes 1--8 and accompanying text. 
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missions’ of federal agencies.’”171  The NAHB Court noted that TVA 
v. Hill was decided years before § 402.03 was adopted, and insisted 
that the agency action in the snail darter case was discretionary 
because TVA was not required by statute to complete the Tellico 
Dam.172  Thus, the Court managed to distinguish TVA v. Hill, but 
never really explained how it found “fundamental ambiguity” in 
the same statutory provision that had once been so clear.  Indeed, 
the Court had stated in the earlier case, “One would be hard 
pressed to find a statutory provision whose terms were any plainer 
than those in § 7 of the Endangered Species Act.”173 
The majority completed its analysis by holding that EPA decisions 
on delegating § 402 permitting programs are non-discretionary 
actions for purposes of ESA § 7.  Having already declared that the 
CWA imposes a mandatory duty on the EPA to approve a state 
request if the nine statutory criteria are met, the Court concluded 
simply that “[n]othing in the text of § 402(b) authorizes the EPA to 
consider the protection of threatened or endangered species as an 
end in itself when evaluating a transfer application.”174  The Court 
also noted that EPA and the Services had already determined that 
consultation was not required for these decisions, and since the 
Services were interpreting their own regulation, that interpretation 
was entitled to Auer deference.175 
Four justices dissented, arguing that the majority had not 
attempted to read CWA § 402 and ESA § 7 in a way that would give 
effect to both statutory provisions.176  The dissent also argued that 
under TVA v. Hill, § 7(a)(2) applies to any federal agency action, 
discretionary or mandatory, and that 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 cannot be 
read as imposing a new, “discretionary” limitation that is 
inconsistent with the text of the ESA.177  Finally, the dissent argued 
171. NAHB, 127 S. Ct. at 2536 (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173, 185, 188 (1978)). 
172. Id. at 2536--37. 
173. TVA, 437 U.S. at 173. 
174. NAHB, 127 S. Ct. at 2537. 
175. “An agency’s interpretation of the meaning of its own regulations is entitled to 
deference ‘unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,’ Auer v. Robbins, 519 
U.S. 452, 461 (1997) . . ., and that deferential standard is plainly met here.”  Id. at 2537--38. 
176. Justice Stevens authored the dissent, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. at 2538 (2007) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Breyer authored his own brief dissenting opinion.  Id. at 2552 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).  Much of the Stevens dissent was devoted to explaining two different approaches 
whereby the Court could have given effect to both statutes.  Id. at 2544--48. 
177. Id. at 2541--43. 
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that the EPA’s decisions regarding state delegation requests are 
indeed discretionary, because the statute does give the agency some 
discretion in deciding whether the nine criteria in § 402 are met.  
The dissent pointed to no CWA language that would seem to 
empower the EPA to consider the effects of a permitting transfer 
on listed species, but argued that even the majority should be 
willing to apply § 7 to this decision because § 402 did provide the 
agency some discretion.178 
C. What NAHB Means for Agency Discretion and Section 7 Duties 
The NAHB case seems likely to raise questions about federal 
agencies’ duty to consult on a wide range of activities.  Read 
broadly, the majority opinion might significantly reduce the reach 
of ESA § 7(a)(2).  Thus, setting aside serious questions about 
whether the Court’s 5-4 decision in the context of CWA § 402 was 
correct,179 this subsection attempts to draw some lessons from that 
decision that should be relevant to other, arguably non-
discretionary federal actions. 
First, and most obviously, 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 is good law.  Despite 
the clear tension between the statute, which makes § 7 applicable 
to “any action authorized, funded, or carried out” by a federal 
agency, and the rule, with its trigger of “discretionary Federal 
178. “If we are to take the Court’s approach seriously, once any discretion has been 
identified—as it has here—§ 7(a)(2) must apply.”  Id. at 2549 (emphasis in original). 
179. The Stevens and Breyer dissents—which combine to exceed Justice Alito’s majority 
opinion in length—raise many of these questions, but the majority opinion is open to 
dispute on additional grounds.  For example, the Court’s rationale for declaring ESA            
§ 7(a)(2) ambiguous is tenuous.  Essentially, the majority first cast the issue as whether the 
ESA had impliedly repealed CWA § 402(b), and then stated that a broad reading of               
§ 7(a)(2) would “partially override every federal statute mandating agency action by 
subjecting such action to the further condition that it pose no jeopardy to endangered 
species.”  Id. at 2533.  The majority quoted earlier cases stating that “the words of a statute 
must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” 
Id. at 2534 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132--33 
(2000)) (internal quotations omitted).  Unlike the usual case where statutory context is used 
in interpretation, however, the “context” supposedly giving rise to ambiguity in § 7(a)(2) was 
not other provisions of the same statute or related statutes, but unspecified provisions of 
other, unspecified statutes that could be viewed as conflicting with ESA requirements.  The 
majority simply pointed in the general direction of the U.S. Code, and insisted that because 
§ 7(a)(2) potentially could effect an en masse implied repeal of many provisions, “we are left 
with a fundamental ambiguity that is not resolved by the statutory text.”  Id.  And with that, 
the Court opened up § 7(a)(2) for agency and judicial interpretation, despite its famous 
statement in TVA v. Hill that it would be hard to find a statute written any plainer than ESA  
§ 7.  See supra notes 1--8 and accompanying text. 
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involvement or control,”180 the Court upheld the rule after finding 
it eligible for Chevron deference.181  The majority also rejected two 
narrow (and somewhat strained) interpretations of the rule that 
would have left it with little or no legal effect.182  Thus, unless and 
until it is changed by statute or rule,183 § 402.03 will continue to 
limit the applicability of § 7 to those actions where a federal agency 
exercises discretion. 
Second, an agency has no discretion under § 402.03 if it is 
“required by statute to take [an action] once certain specified 
triggering events have occurred.”184  The emphasis on required must 
not obscure the other elements of a non-discretionary action as 
specified by the Court: (1) the command must be in a statute,185 (2) 
the statute must specify certain prerequisites, and (3) the statute must 
direct the agency to take a particular action once those prerequisites 
are met.  Under this test, the EPA had no discretion regarding 
Arizona’s request for § 402 permitting authority: the EPA was 
required by the CWA itself (not by rule) to determine if the state’s 
application met nine criteria specified in the statute, and to 
delegate the authority if it did.  Significantly, the majority found 
that CWA § 402 set forth an exclusive list of criteria for the EPA to 
consider in making these decisions, and that any additional 
criterion—in this case, the “no jeopardy to listed species” standard 
of ESA § 7(a)(2)—would conflict with the statutory mandate.186 
Third, although the Court stated that “discretion presumes that 
180. See supra notes 163--69 and accompanying text. 
181. NAHB, 127 S. Ct. at 2533--35 (finding the statute ambiguous on the issue before the 
Court, and upholding the agency’s interpretation as reasonable). 
182. Id. at 2535--36 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s view of the rule as being coextensive 
with the statute, as well as the dissent’s argument that § 402.03 does not limit the 
applicability of § 7 only to discretionary actions). 
183. Although the Court noted that § 7(a)(2) would pose a problem of implied repeals if 
it were not limited to discretionary federal actions, id. at 2533, it did not indicate that            
§ 402.03 was the only reasonable interpretation of the statute’s applicability, leaving open the 
possibility that a future rulemaking could remove the “discretionary federal involvement or 
control” language and still be eligible for Chevron deference.  See Nat’l Cable Telecomm. 
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (prior judicial construction of a 
statute trumps agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if prior 
holding is based on unambiguous statutory text). 
184. NAHB, 127 S. Ct. at 2536 (emphasis original).  The court also emphasized required at 
2534–35 (“[W]hen an agency is required to do something by statute, it simply lacks the power 
to insure that such action will not jeopardize endangered species”). 
185. The “implied repeal” issue arises only if an agency faces a conflict between a statute 
and its duties under ESA § 7. 
186. Id. at 2532--33. 
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an agency can exercise ‘judgment’ in connection with a particular 
action,” an agency may exercise judgment without having 
discretionary involvement or control under § 402.03.187  The 
majority acknowledged that the EPA “may exercise some judgment 
in determining whether a State has demonstrated” that its 
application for permitting authority satisfies the statutory 
requirements.188  By restricting the EPA to deciding whether the 
nine criteria are met, however, the CWA does not allow the sort of 
judgment that would subject the agency decision to ESA § 7: 
“Nothing in the text of § 402(b) authorizes the EPA to consider the 
protection of threatened or endangered species as an end in itself 
when evaluating a transfer application.”189  Thus, the question is not 
whether an agency exercises judgment in deciding on a particular 
action, but whether the statute leaves room for the agency to 
consider the needs of listed species in making that decision. 
Fourth, an administrative decision that a particular agency action 
involves no discretionary federal involvement or control is entitled 
to deference from the courts, but only if the decision is made by 
FWS or NMFS, not the agency taking the action.  In NAHB, the 
Court noted that both Services had recently determined that EPA’s 
decisions on delegating § 402 permitting authority are non-
discretionary under § 402.03.  The Court accepted the Services’ 
(rather than the EPA’s) interpretation under Auer, whereby courts 
defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own rules “unless plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”190 If an agency were 
to claim that one of its activities was non-discretionary under           
§ 402.03, that claim would not receive Auer deference because the 
agency would be interpreting the Services’ rule, not its own.191 
Fifth, although it refused to follow TVA v. Hill in its 
187. Id. at 2535 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415–16 
(1971)). 
188. Id. at 2537. 
189. Id. In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the majority failed to follow its own logic 
when it acknowledged that EPA does exercise some judgment in these decisions, but found 
that the agency did not have the kind of discretion that would trigger § 7.  Id. at 2548--49 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
190. Id. at 2537--38 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)). 
191. Cf. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (denying Auer deference to agency that 
interpreted a regulation that merely restated statutory language because an agency gains 
“special authority to interpret its own words” when it uses its own expertise and experience 
to develop a rule). See also NAHB, 127 S. Ct. at 2543--44 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that 
EPA would not be entitled to Chevron deference for interpreting the ESA, because the 
Interior and Commerce Departments administer that statute). 
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interpretation of ESA § 7(a)(2), the NAHB Court did not undercut 
a key conclusion of that earlier case:  that the ESA “reveals a 
conscious decision by Congress to give endangered species priority 
over the ‘primary missions’ of federal agencies.”192  The majority 
distinguished TVA v. Hill because in the earlier case, the federal 
agency was not required by statute to build the Tellico Dam 
regardless of its effects on listed species.193  Despite repeated 
statements by Congressional appropriators directing TVA to build 
Tellico Dam in spite of the ESA and the snail darter,194 the NAHB 
Court deemed that project “discretionary” because these 
statements were in report language, rather than in statute.195  Thus, 
even where Congress has clearly expressed an intent for an agency 
to do something, it appears that the action is non-discretionary 
under § 402.03 only if the agency is required to act by statute. 
Perhaps surprisingly, NAHB is generally consistent with the Ninth 
Circuit’s approach in cases other than Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA.196  
In those cases, the Ninth Circuit generally read § 402.03 as 
triggering ESA § 7 only for those actions involving agency 
discretion, and it found that discretion only where the laws 
governing that action gave the agency some freedom to consider 
192. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill 437 U.S. 153, 185 (1978). 
193. In regard to TVA’s duty to build Tellico Dam, the NAHB Court characterized its 
earlier decision thusly: 
 
    Central to the Court’s decision was the conclusion that Congress did not mandate that 
the TVA put the dam into operation; there was no statutory command to that effect; and 
there was therefore no basis for contending that applying the ESA’s no-jeopardy 
requirement would implicitly repeal another affirmative congressional directive. 
 
NAHB, 127 S. Ct. at 2536--37 (emphasis in original). 
194. See TVA, 437 U.S. 153, 163--71 (describing statements, primarily by the 
Appropriations Committees, expressing the belief that the ESA did not apply to the Tellico 
Project and directing TVA to complete it). 
195. The majority even argued that the dissent was wrong in believing that TVA would 
have had to finish the dam if the snail darter had not been listed under the ESA: “[T]he Acts 
appropriating funds to the TVA . . . simply did not require the agency to use any of the 
generally appropriated funds to complete the Tellico Dam Project.”  NAHB, 127 S. Ct. at 
2537 n.9 (citing TVA, 437 U.S. at 189--93) (emphasis in original).  Perhaps only the Supreme 
Court would view a federal agency as free to disregard clear, specific, repeated directives in 
Appropriations Committee and conference report language relating to appropriations 
statutes for the sole reason that the directives do not appear in the text of the statutes 
themselves. 
196. Defenders of Wildilife v. EPA, 420 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom. National 
Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007). 
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listed species in making its decisions.197  The Ninth Circuit departed 
from its own precedent in Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA by reading the 
rule as coextensive with the “any action” language of ESA § 
7(a)(2),198 and by holding that EPA had an independent duty to 
comply with § 7 even if the CWA left the agency no room to 
consider listed species in deciding on Arizona’s application for 
permitting authority.199  Thus, even though the NAHB opinion 
mentions none of the other Ninth Circuit cases, its decision may be 
viewed as returning the law approximately to where that circuit had 
brought it before Defenders.  If anything, by emphasizing that an 
agency is not subject to § 7(a)(2) if another mandatory statute 
leaves it no discretion to consider the needs of listed species, the 
Court may have made it more difficult for an agency to claim that 
rules, contracts or other legal constraints leave it with no discretion 
under § 402.03. 
Nonetheless, NAHB undoubtedly will embolden those both 
inside and outside the federal government who would like to 
reduce the sweep of ESA § 7.  The effects of that case probably will 
be disputed in many contexts, but one is nearly certain: the 
operation of federal water projects by the USBR.  The next section 
analyzes the extent to which these operations are, or should be, 
subject to § 7(a)(2) in light of the NAHB decision. 
IV. USBR’S SECTION 7 DUTIES RELATING TO PROJECT OPERATIONS 
AFTER NAHB 
Long before the Supreme Court’s NAHB decision, USBR’s 
discretion was a hot issue in litigation over endangered species and 
use of Reclamation project water.  This section examines how that 
issue has been addressed in the ongoing Rio Grande Silvery Minnow 
litigation, and then provides legal and policy considerations 
relevant to USBR’s § 7 duties in operating federal water projects. 
197. See supra notes 160--161 and accompanying text. 
198. Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 969.  Although the court characterized this 
conclusion as being consistent with its earlier cases, the cases themselves contradict that 
statement, as they generally interpret § 402.03 less narrowly. 
199. Id. at 967, 971.  On this latter point, the Ninth Circuit had reached the same 
conclusion in Washington Toxics Coalition v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 2008] Reclamation Projects and the ESA 33 
 
A. Disputing USBR’s Discretion: the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow 
Litigation 
The legal dispute over the fate of the Rio Grande silvery 
minnow200 and water use in New Mexico’s “middle” Rio Grande is 
complex, and several authors have addressed it in detail.201  The 
focus of the dispute is a small fish, once abundant throughout 
much of the Rio Grande watershed but now nearly extinct in the 
wild because dams, diversion structures, and low flows have altered 
its river habitat dramatically.  By the time the minnow was listed in 
1994, FWS believed that the species was located only in a 170-mile 
reach of the Rio Grande between Cochiti Dam and the headwaters 
of Elephant Butte Reservoir.202  Flows in this stretch of the river are 
heavily influenced by the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District 
(“MRGCD”), which diverts water for irrigation of more than 60,000 
acres within a 150-mile-long area south of Santa Fe.203  MRGCD has 
contracts to receive water from two USBR projects, the Middle Rio 
Grande Project and the San Juan-Chama Project; several other New 
Mexico water users, notably the City of Albuquerque, also have San 
Juan-Chama contracts.204  Although the silvery minnow litigation 
has involved a wide range of issues,205 the case has come down to a 
dispute over whether USBR has any discretion206 under these 
200. Hybognathus amarus. 
201. See, e.g., Joan E. Drake, Student Writing, Contractual Discretion and the Endangered 
Species Act: Can the Bureau of Reclamation Reallocate Federal Project Water for Endangered Species in 
the Middle Rio Grande?, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 487 (2001); Sean O’Connor, Comment, The Rio 
Grande Silvery Minnow and the Endangered Species Act,  73 U. COLO. L. REV. 673 (2002); Beth 
Richards, Case Note, The Pump Don’t Work Because the Bureau Took the Handle: The United States 
Bureau of Reclamation’s Discretion to Reduce Water Deliveries to Comply with the Endangered Species 
Act, 4 WYO. L. REV. 113 (2004); Ethan R. Hasenstein, Note, Frankenstein and Pitbull?  
Transmogrifying the Endangered Species Act and “Fixing” the San Juan-Chama Project after Rio 
Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 34 ENVTL. L. 1247 (2004). 
202. Final Rule to List the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow as an Endangered Species, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 36,988 (July 20, 1994).  In listing the species as endangered, FWS also identified other 
factors for the silvery minnow’s decline, including competition from non-native species.  Id. 
at 36989. 
203. See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109, 1134 (10th Cir. 2003), vacated 
as moot, 355 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2004). 
204. See id. at 1122--27 (discussing these two projects and their associated contracts). 
205. See id. at 1115--20 (summarizing history through early 2003). 
206. At one time, the Corps of Engineers’ discretion in operating three dams on the Rio 
Grande—Abiquiu, Cochiti, and Jemez Canyon—was also in dispute.  In contrast to the USBR 
dams, which are operated almost exclusively for water supply, the Corps dams are primarily 
flood control facilities.  See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 469 F. Supp. 2d 973, 996--97 
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contracts and the relevant statutes, such that the two projects must 
be operated subject to the requirements of ESA § 7. 
 
In the late 1990s, with the silvery minnow continuing to slide 
toward extinction despite its ESA listing, USBR initiated § 7 
consultation on its project operations.207  In its 1999 biological 
assessment, however, USBR argued that its operating discretion was 
limited by its “obligation to meet water orders from users in 
accordance with contract obligations.  In meeting these obligations, 
[USBR] exercises discretion in how water is stored in system 
reservoirs and released through federal facilities, but that 
discretion is narrowed by the contract requirements and delivery 
schedules.”208  USBR also argued that its operating discretion was 
constrained by both project authorizing statutes—“Congress 
authorized the Middle Rio Grande Project for domestic, municipal, 
and irrigation purposes only,” not for fish habitat—and general 
Reclamation laws:  “[W]ater can only be stored and released from 
Reclamation reservoirs for valid beneficial uses, and consequently 
must be released at a time and in a way to meet water delivery 
calls.”209  Thus, even though USBR consulted on its project 
operations, that consultation was narrowly circumscribed by the 
agency’s view of its discretion.  USBR contended, and FWS 
agreed,210 that USBR could not reduce deliveries to users holding 
contracts for San Juan-Chama Project or Middle Rio Grande 
Project water, regardless of the ESA.211 
(D.N.M. 2002).  In the first reported Silvery Minnow decision, the district court found that 
statutes provide “rather clear operating criteria” for operating these dams and specify narrow 
grounds for deviating from these criteria.  Id. at 996--98.  It held that the Corps is therefore 
not subject to the requirements of ESA § 7.  Id. at 998--99.  The court distinguished the 
USBR projects, which operate under “more discretionary language” than do the Corps 
facilities.  Id. at 997--98.  The plaintiffs did not challenge this holding on appeal.  Silvery 
Minnow, 333 F.3d at 1115 n.2. 
207. See Drake, supra note 201, at 496--97. 
208.  Drake, supra note 201, at 497–98 (quoting BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE INTERIOR & ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, PROGRAMMATIC 
BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL DISCRETIONARY ACTIONS RELATED TO WATER 
MANAGEMENT ON THE MIDDLE RIO GRANDE, NEW MEXICO 14 (Oct. 1999)). 
209. Id. 
210. See 469 F. Supp. 2d at 998--99 (noting that FWS adopted USBR’s legal position 
regarding USBR’s limited discretion in operating the projects). 
211. Not surprisingly, the users themselves also argued that USBR had no discretion to 
reduce their water deliveries.  See, e.g., Brief for Defendant-Intervenor-Appellant City of 
Albuquerque at 22–23, Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 469 F. Supp. 2d 973 (10th Cir. 
Nov. 18, 2002) ( Nos. 02-2254, 02-255, 02-2267, and 02-2304) (arguing that Albuquerque’s 
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The U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico (Judge 
Parker) disagreed, holding that USBR does have sufficient 
discretion to reduce water deliveries as needed to meet its ESA 
obligations, and that its consultations on project operations must 
therefore not exclude that possibility.212  The court found 
discretion to reduce Middle Rio Grande Project deliveries primarily 
in a provision of the 1963 contract between USBR and MRGCD, 
stating that “in no event shall any liability accrue” against the 
United States in the event of a shortage of project water caused by 
“drought and other causes.”213  The court thought it appropriate to 
read this provision broadly “because drought and dryness are what 
affect the continued existence of the silvery minnow.”214  As for the 
San-Juan Chama Project, the court held that USBR could consider 
reallocating water to endangered species based on three provisions 
of the relevant contracts,215 and because Congress had authorized 
this project to supply water for a variety of uses and to provide fish 
and wildlife benefits in the Rio Grande Valley.216  Unlike the issue 
of discretion to reduce Middle Rio Grande Project deliveries, which 
it had called a close question, the court concluded that USBR 
clearly had discretion to shift San Juan-Chama Project water to 
endangered species.217 
Even though it had lost the battle regarding discretion, the 
contract and the project authorizing statute do not allow water to be used for endangered 
species). 
212. Silvery Minnow, 469 F. Supp. 2d 973, 998--99. 
213. Id. at 991--92.  The 1963 agreement amended the original 1951 contract between 
USBR and MRGCD, which provided that the U.S. would not be liable “[s]hould there ever 
occur a shortage in the quantity of water which normally would be available through and by 
means of said project . . . .”  Id. at 991. 
214. Id. at 994.  The court concluded that when these contract terms are viewed “together 
with BOR’s statutory duty to limit MRGCD’s diversions to amounts reasonably needed for 
beneficial use, BOR’s discretion becomes even more manifest.” Id.  The court’s discussion of 
the beneficial use issue appears at 992. 
215. The court described these three provisions as: 
 
(1) a provision that “during periods of scarcity when the actual available water supply 
may be less than the estimated firm yield,” the contracts “shall share in the available 
water supply” pro rata with other contractors; (2) a clause immunizing BOR from liability 
for failure to deliver water to the contractors because of “shortages” resulting from 
“drought and any other causes;” and (3) a provision reducing contractors’ costs to 
reflect a higher portion of water going to fish and wildlife needs. 
 
Id. at 995 (citations to administrative record omitted). 
216. Id. (citing Act of June 13, 1962, Pub. L. 87-483 (76 Stat. 96)). 
217. Silvery Minnow, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 994–96. 
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government had won the war over project operations—
temporarily—because Judge Parker’s decision of April 2002 had 
nonetheless upheld the 2001 BO, which did not provide for 
reducing project water deliveries to contractors.218  Thus, the Tenth 
Circuit dismissed all appeals on the discretion issue in September 
2002.219  In that same month, however, FWS—prompted by USBR 
and extreme drought conditions in the Rio Grande basin—issued a 
new BO that allowed the key reach of the river to go dry, 
potentially wiping out the last wild population of silvery minnows.220  
When the plaintiffs challenged the new BO, Judge Parker chastised 
USBR for continuing to insist that it lacked discretion to cut project 
water deliveries to benefit the minnow, and for doing nothing to 
avert a looming extinction crisis.  The court invalidated the new 
BO, re-stated its earlier holding regarding USBR discretion to 
reduce water deliveries, and ordered the agency to provide certain 
minimum flows through 2003.221  It concluded its order with an 
unmistakable command:  “If necessary to meet flow requirements 
in 2003, . . . [USBR] must reduce contract deliveries under the San 
Juan-Chama Project and/or the Middle Rio Grande Project . . . 
consistent with [USBR’s] legal authority as determined in the 
Court’s April 12, 2002 Memorandum Opinion and Order.”222 
218. Id. at 999 (“Even though FWS accepted BOR’s erroneous view that it lacked 
discretion . . . to alter water deliveries to contractors, FWS came up with an interim solution 
to avoid jeopardy in coordination with all the major players in the middle Rio Grande 
basin.”).  The court observed that the federal agencies had made “a valiant effort to protect 
the minnow without altering water deliveries to federal contractors,” and had arrived at an 
interim solution that “may be workable.”  Id. at 1000.  The court noted, however, that in the 
future, “when the parties go back to the table, either in informal negotiations or in 
reinitiation of formal consultation, the annual water deliveries that I have identified as 
discretionary will be available to be considered for use in protecting the endangered silvery 
minnow from extinction.”  Id. 
219. The court dismissed appeals from the contractors for lack of standing, because they 
could not show that their water deliveries would actually be reduced as a result of the lower 
court’s rulings on discretion.  The government’s appeals were dismissed because the case was 
ongoing in the lower court, and the appeal offered no basis for interlocutory appellate 
jurisdiction.  Rio Grand Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 46 Fed. Appx. 929, 933, 935 (10th Cir. 2002). 
220. See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1225--28, 1231--32 
(D.N.M. 2002) (noting that USBR had proposed to allow the “all-important” San Acacia 
reach—home to nearly all of the remaining wild minnows—to dry up, and that “extensive 
river drying in the San Acacia Reach could result in the extinction of the silvery minnow in 
the wild”). 
221. The court allowed lower flows for the remainder of 2002 than would have been 
allowed under the 2001 BO.  For 2003, the court required USBR to maintain the flows 
provided in 2001 BO unless and until a new one was issued.  Id. at 1237--38. 
222. Id. at 1238. 
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expected, and 
concluded: 
ontracts disconnects them from their congressional authorization.224 
 supported its interpretation of the Rio 
 
ow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003), vacated as moot, 
35
so noted that no contract provision specifies an absolute 
qu
995). 
 existed.  Silvery Minnow, 333 F.3d at 1128.  The CVPIA 
wa
e project authorizations relating to fish 
and wild
A divided Tenth Circuit panel affirmed Judge Parker’s 
decision.223  The majority focused on contract provisions allocating 
a portion of project costs to fish and wildlife, precluding 
government liability for water shortages due to drought or other 
causes, and providing that contracts will share in the shortfall when 
the “actual available water supply” is less than 
 
These clauses, taken together, establish that BOR retained the 
discretion to determine the “available water” from which allocations 
would be made, allotments, which, in times of scarcity, might be 
altered for “other causes,” the prevention of jeopardy to an 
endangered species.  The terms of these negotiated contracts, 
properly read together, presume BOR’s discretion in their 
implementation.  Moreover, reading BOR’s discretion to manage and 
deliver “available water” out of the plain language of the Repayment 
C
 
The court also endorsed the district court’s reliance on three 
Ninth Circuit cases, O’Neill v. United States,225 NRDC v. Houston,226 
and Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n v. Patterson,227 in which the 
court had held that USBR has authority to allocate project water 
for endangered species.  The government sought to distinguish 
these cases228 because they involved a statute unlike any that 
pertains to the Rio Grande projects, 229 but some of the key contract 
terms were similar, and the Tenth Circuit identified “general 
precepts” of the cases which
223. Rio Grande Silvery Minn
5 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2004). 
224. Id. at 1129.  The court al
antity of water.  Id. at 1130–31. 
225. O’Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1
226. See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text. 
227. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 1999). 
228. According to the court, USBR sought to distinguish those cases “on the ground that 
subsequently enacted legislation, the Central Valley Project Improvement Act, expressly 
allocated project water for fish and wildlife,” leaving those cases irrelevant to the Rio Grande 
projects, for which no such legislation
s no factor in Klamath Water Users. 
229. Authorizing statutes for the Middle Rio Grande and San Juan-Chama Projects 
appeared to play a minor role in the majority’s decision regarding USBR discretion, 
although the court did note various provisions of th
life.  Silvery Minnow, 333 F.3d at 1122, 1125. 
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G
erms doctrine applies, 
al
discretionary 
 
ording to the court, the three Ninth Circuit cases provide these three applicable 
rinciples: 
 
basis for BOR’s retaining 
discretion to allocate available water to comply with the ESA. 
Id
in this litigation,” 
an
ng United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 877--78 (1996) 
(o ). 
es in the absence of a shortage does violence to their language and intent.”  Id. at 
11
rande project contracts.230 
The two majority judges also produced a “concurring” opinion 
on the unmistakable terms doctrine of federal contract law.231  This 
opinion stated that any contract to which the government is a party 
“remains subject to the demands of a subsequent exercise of 
sovereign power unless the contract expressly provides in 
unmistakable terms that subsequent sovereign acts will not affect it.  
A silent contract preserves the government’s right to modify it by 
subsequent legislation.”232  The concurrence stated that because the 
USBR contracts have no provisions explicitly immunizing them 
from future legislation, the unmistakable t
lowing the ESA to modify the contracts.233 
Judge Kelly dissented sharply, finding no discretion in any of the 
contract provisions relied upon by the majority.234  He also found 
no discretionary authority in any applicable federal statute, and 
distinguished the trio of Ninth Circuit cases relied upon by the 
majority.235  Finally, Judge Kelly argued that the unmistakable terms 
doctrine did not operate to allow the ESA to alter these contracts, 
because § 7 does not even apply in the absence of 
230. Acc
p
First, under principles of contract interpretation, the plain terms govern.  Second, the 
contracts, written under the reclamation laws, and all “acts amendatory and 
supplementary thereto,” envision applying subsequent legislation in their interpretation.  
Finally, the plain terms of the shortage clauses provide the 
 
. at 1130. 
231. Judge Porfilio wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Judge Seymour, who 
wrote the concurring opinion in which Judge Porfilio joined.  Id. at 1138 (Seymour, J., 
concurring).  Neither opinion explains this curious arrangement.  One can only surmise that 
the judges were reluctant to base their majority opinion on a doctrine—the “unmistakable 
terms” doctrine of federal contract law—that had been “largely ignored 
d not even mentioned in the government’s briefing. See id. at 1139  n.1. 
232. Id. at 1139, citi
pinion of Souter, J.
233. Id. at 1139. 
234. Id. at 1145--46 (Kelly, J., dissenting).  Judge Kelly devoted much of his dissent to 
examining specific contract provisions and finding that none provides discretion to reduce 
water deliveries under the ESA.  Most significantly, he concluded that the contract terms 
shielding the government from liability for water shortages “are defensive in nature, and to 
interpret them as affirmative grants of discretion to enforce the ESA and reduce contract 
deliveri
51. 
235. Id. at 1153--57. 
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fe
 water users on the Rio Grande, 
th
projects.242  Briefly stated, the question for any project is whether 
 
 San Juan-Chama Project, the effective expiration of Judge Parker’s 
in
d. at 1015--16.  The court explained that his decision would allow the parties 
“a
deral power, which the dissent found absent here.236 
The Tenth Circuit’s decision prompted a petition for en banc 
rehearing, but within months the panel’s decision had been 
vacated as moot.237  Nonetheless, the case precipitated a flurry of 
legal activity, including issuance of a new BO for project 
operations, Congressional enactments immunizing the San-Juan 
Chama Project from the ESA and the new BO from legal challenge, 
and settlement of all issues involving the City of Albuquerque.238  A 
dispute persists, however, over USBR’s discretion to operate the 
Middle Rio Grande Project to meet ESA requirements.239  In 
November 2005, Judge Parker refused to vacate his earlier 
decisions on USBR discretion regarding that project, and instead 
entered a final judgment incorporating those decisions as they 
relate to the Middle Rio Grande Project.240  As of this writing, the 
matter is once again up on appeal before the Tenth Circuit; more 
than five years after Judge Parker first ruled that USBR has 
discretion to reduce deliveries to
e matter remains unresolved.241 
Although the Middle Rio Grande has been ground zero for the 
legal dispute over USBR project operational discretion, the basic 
question in the Silvery Minnow litigation would be the same at many 
236. Id. at 1148--49. 
237. See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 355 F.3d 1215, 1218, 1222 (10th Cir. 2004).  
The court found the appeal moot for various reasons, including a subsequent Congressional 
enactment relating to the
junction, and favorable climatic conditions that had resulted in better habitat for the 
minnow.  Id. at 1219--21. 
238. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1007, 1011 (D.N.M. 2005), 
explains these various developments. 
239. Id. at 1009 (scope of USBR’s discretionary authority to operate the Middle Rio 
Grande Project to benefit the minnow “remains a live and justiciable issue”). 
240. I
nother opportunity to appeal the important discretion issue as it relates to the MRGP.”  Id. 
at 1011. 
241. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, Nos. 05-2399, 06-2020, and 06-2021 (10th Cir. 
filed Dec. 2005–Jan. 2006). 
242. Shortly before the Tenth Circuit’s Silvery Minnow decision, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia decided another case involving USBR project operations, this time 
on the Lower Colorado River.  Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 257 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 
2003).  In that case, plaintiffs argued that the Interior Department had a duty to consult 
more broadly on its operation of federal water projects on the Lower Colorado, a stretch of 
river where the allocation of water is dictated by a unique set of federal statutes, U.S. 
Supreme Court decrees, interstate agreements, and international treaties known as the “Law 
of the River.”  See id. at 57--58.  Interior argued that it had no duty to consult over the impact 
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of its operations on listed species living exclusively in Mexico for two reasons:  the Law of the 
River (especially a Supreme Court decree) prohibited the agency from increasing water 
under the reclamation statutes, water rights, and contracts 
governing the project, USBR has discretion to operate the project 
to benefit listed species, if that operation could harm traditional 
project beneficiaries.243  The Tenth Circuit’s vacated opinion in the 
Silvery Minnow case indicates how complex that question can be, 
and the NAHB decision has added another wrinkle to the analysis.  
With the caveat that each project has its own legal regime, the 
remainder of this section offers some general observations on this 
question that will be relevant to most if not all USBR projects. 
B. Legal Considerations Regarding USBR Project Operations and 
Discretion 
1. Operating a Water Project is an Inherently Discretionary 
Activity 
Cases applying 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 to a particular federal agency 
action typically focus intensively on the law applicable to that 
action, inquiring whether that governing law gives the agency the 
kind of discretion that would trigger ESA § 7.244  In the context of 
USBR project operations, however, it seems appropriate to begin 
by considering the nature of the activity itself. 
Operating a federal water project is highly complex, partly 
 
deliveries to Mexico, and the agency had no control over the species’ habitat in Mexico 
because water was managed by Mexico once it crossed the border.  The court agreed that the 
agency was not required to consult over its impacts on Mexican species for these reasons, 
concluding that “it seems unlikely that any case will present facts that more clearly make any 
agency’s actions nondiscretionary than this one: a Supreme Court injunction, an 
international treaty, federal statutes, and contracts between the government and water users 
that account for every acre foot of lower Colorado River water.”  Id. at 69. 
243. Although Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, id., held that Interior lacked discretion to 
consult on the impacts of its operations on certain listed species, that decision may not 
translate to other federal water projects because of the unique nature of the Law of the River 
(especially regarding deliveries to Mexico), plus the fact that the species involved were 
beyond the territory and control of the United States.  Both legally and factually, the Silvery 
Minnow case is far more representative of most USBR projects that may affect a listed species 
than Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton. 
244. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2537 
(2007) (CWA § 402(b) leaves EPA no discretion to consider listed species in deciding 
whether to transfer permitting authority to a state); see also Turtle Island Restoration 
Network v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 340 F.3d 969, 975--77 (9th Cir. 2003) (High Seas 
Fishing Compliance Act gives agency discretion to protect sea turtles in issuing permits for 
fishing vessels.). 
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s in managing Upper 
Klamath Lake, part of the Klamath Project: 
re, and on precipitation 
itions) may significantly affect Upper Klamath Lake inflows as 
ell.246 
circumstances dictate.  In short, if a discretionary action is one that 
 
because USBR must manage the project to meet an array of legal 
obligations, such as irrigation, flood control, recreation, power 
generation, and meeting tribal water needs.245  Even if the law were 
relatively simple, however, USBR would face major practical 
challenges in determining how much water to store and release on 
any given day in light of uncertainty about available water supplies, 
demands for water and power, and other variables.  Consider the 
following description of USBR’s difficultie
 
The Bureau of Reclamation must manage water resources carefully in 
order to meet its competing purposes and obligations.  This need to 
strike a proper balance is particularly challenging because Upper 
Klamath Lake is relatively shallow and therefore, the Klamath 
Project’s storage capacity is limited.  Water levels in the Lake vary 
from year to year, depending to a significant extent upon the 
previous winter’s snowfall and temperatu
conditions during the spring and summer. 
In order to prepare Project operation plans, the Bureau of 
Reclamation relies on the Natural Resources Conservation Service 
(“NRCS”) Streamflow Forecast for key areas in the Upper Klamath 
Basin.  The NRCS forecast period runs from April 1 to the end of the 
current water year, September 30.  NRCS issues its forecasts on a 
monthly basis, between January and June.  The reliability of these 
forecasts increase [sic] with each month, as the forecast period 
becomes shorter.  Weather changes during the year, however, (for 
example, due to unusually hot and dry conditions, or unusually rainy 
cond
w
 
Thus, for each of its projects USBR must constantly assess its 
duties, the available facts, and predictions about the future, make 
its best decisions in light of these factors, and make changes as 
245. See, e.g., Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 138  
F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1231 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (describing USBR’s legal duties in managing the 
Klamath Project, including water supply contracts for irrigation, delivering water to national 
wildlife refuges, honoring reserved water rights of tribes, protecting tribal trust resources 
including salmon, and complying with ESA § 7).  While not every project is operated for all 
of these purposes, each is very important to the overall Reclamation program.  U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, BRIEF HISTORY OF THE BUREAU OF 
RECLAMATION, http://www.usbr.gov/history/BRIEFHist.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2007). 
246. Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, 138 F. Supp.2d at 1231 (internal citations 
omitted). 
 42 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 33:1 
 
involves an exercise of judgment,247 then operating a large, multi-
purpose federal water project is about as discretionary as it gets.248 
For this reason, USBR project operations are very different from 
the kinds of agency action that courts have held to be non-
discretionary under § 402.03, such as transfer of permitting 
authority from EPA to a state (NAHB) or approval of a logging road 
across public lands under an existing agreement (Seneca).  Those 
cases involved a one-time decision by a federal agency in response 
to a specific request from a non-federal entity, and the only 
question for the agency was whether that request met an 
established set of defined criteria.  One might say that those non-
discretionary actions involved little more than an agency reviewing 
an application against a prepared checklist and deciding whether 
to stamp the application “approved” or “disapproved.”  Operating a 
water project, by contrast, is an ongoing, dynamic, multi-factor, 
forward-looking exercise—an activity that not only allows for 
agency discretion, but demands it. 
2. No General Statute Strips USBR of Operating Discretion. 
In the Silvery Minnow litigation, both the District Court and 
Tenth Circuit opinions analyzed the discretion issue by combing 
through the statutes and contracts relevant to two specific 
Reclamation projects in New Mexico, searching for language that 
would provide USBR the discretion to reduce water deliveries to 
existing users in order to preserve the minnow’s last remaining 
habitat in the Rio Grande.249  Judge Parker and the Tenth Circuit 
majority found that discretion, primarily in contract provisions;250 
Judge Kelly, the Tenth Circuit dissenter, emphatically did not.251  In 
light of the recent NAHB decision, however, it is not clear that any 
247. See NAHB, 127 S. Ct. at 2535 (agency discretion presumes an exercise of judgment 
regarding a particular action). 
248. As stated by the Ninth Circuit in a recent case involving operation of the vast, multi-
faceted Central Valley Project, “[T]he Bureau’s is an extremely difficult task: to operate the 
country’s largest federal water management project in a manner so as to meet the Bureau’s 
many obligations.  Recognizing this difficulty, Congress granted the Bureau considerable 
discretion in determining how to meet those obligations.”  Cent. Delta Water Agency v. 
Bureau of Reclamation, 452 F.3d 1021, 1027 (9th Cir. 2006). 
249. See supra notes 234–235 and accompanying text. 
250. See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 469 F. Supp. 2d 973, 994, 996 (D.N.M. 2002); 
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109, 1129 (10th Cir. 2003), vacated as moot, 355 
F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2004). 
251. Silvery Minnow, 333 F.3d 1109, 1145 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
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of the judges in Silvery Minnow have been asking the right question. 
The majority opinion in NAHB rests on the conclusion that a 
federal statute, the Clean Water Act, prohibits the EPA from 
considering the needs of endangered species in deciding whether 
to delegate permitting authority to a state.252  The Court 
interpreted § 402.03 to mean that ESA § 7 does not apply to actions 
that a statute requires an agency to take.  This interpretation, it 
reasoned, “gives effect to the ESA’s provision, but also comports 
with the canon against implied repeals because it stays § 7(a)(2)’s 
mandate where it would effectively override otherwise mandatory 
statutory duties.”253  Thus, according to the words and logic of 
NAHB, an agency is free from § 7(a)(2) duties where a federal 
statute imposes a duty that leaves no room for ESA
No generally applicable statute strips USBR of discretion in 
operating its projects. To the contrary, the agency has had 
authority since the original 1902 Reclamation Act “to perform any 
and all acts and to make such rules and regulations as may be 
necessary and proper” to implement the statute.254  The 1902 Act 
also authorized and directed the Interior Secretary “to use the 
reclamation fund for the operation and maintenance of all 
reservoirs and irrigation works constructed under the provisions of 
this act.”255  Far from ordering USBR to manage project water in 
one specific way, these longstanding provisions seem to provide 
USBR with wide discretion to do what is “necessary and proper” in 
operating projects. 
Some might argue that § 8 of the 1902 Act imposes a mandatory 
duty on USBR to operate its projects in accordance with state water 
laws, thus depriving the agency of discretion to consider listed 
species in project operations (except where state law allows).256  
Even under California v. United States, however, USBR must follow 
state-law requirements only if they are “not inconsistent with 
252. NAHB, 127 S. Ct. at 2532--33.  The Court framed the issue as one of implied repeal, 
id. at 2532--33, and that rationale would apply only if an agency’s duties under ESA § 7 were  
to conflict with a duty imposed by another federal statute. 
253. Id. at 2534. 
254. Reclamation Act, ch. 1093, § 10, 32 Stat. 390 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 373 (2007)). 
255. Reclamation Act, ch. 1093, § 6, 32 Stat. 389 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 491 (2007)). 
256. In his Silvery Minnow dissent, Judge Kelly insisted that allowing USBR “to consult and 
presumably reallocate water . . . is in considerable tension” with Section 8 and with Supreme 
Court authority “recognizing that the federal government generally must respect state-law 
water rights . . . .”  333 F.3d 1109, 1157--58 (10th Cir. 2003) (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
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congressional directives.”257  Reclamation statutes beyond § 8 also 
restrict USBR’s flexibility to a limited extent; for example, § 9(c) of 
the 1939 Reclamation Project Act258 allows the agency to enter into 
contracts to supply water to cities or to furnish electric power from 
its projects, but only if, “in the judgment of the Secretary, it will not 
impair the efficiency of the project for irrigation purposes.”259  That 
provision shows an intent to preserve irrigation over other uses, but 
it only applies to new contracts for non-irrigation purposes, and 
even there it still places the decision “in the judgment of the 
Secretary.” 
One also might argue that the cases applying § 402.03 did not ask 
whether the federal agency had any discretion in taking a particular 
action, but rather, whether it had discretion to weigh the needs of 
listed species in making the decision.  While that is true, those cases 
all involved a legal framework that required an agency to make a 
decision based on certain defined criteria that seriously 
constrained the agency’s discretion; the question in those cases was 
whether that limited discretion left the agency any room to protect 
the species in question.260  The question in those cases was not 
whether the relevant law had affirmatively granted the agency 
discretion to protect listed species, but rather, whether the law had 
foreclosed that discretion by specifying the factors the agency could 
consider in making a particular decision.  In operating its projects, 
USBR simply does not operate within tight statutory limits that 
would raise a serious question about what it can do with the little 
discretion it has remaining. 
Congress has not imposed mandatory, statutory duties that apply 
generally to the operation of all Reclamation projects, but may 
establish such duties for one particular project, thus eliminating 
257. 438 U.S. 645, 678 (1978).  Moreover, California v. United States directly or indirectly 
identified a number a congressional directives that would effectively preempt state law.  See 
Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests v. State Authority under Federal 
Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241, 280 (2006). 
258. Reclamation Project Act of 1939, ch. 418, § 9(c), 53 Stat. 1187 (codified at 43 U.S.C. 
§ 485h(c) (2007)). 
259. 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c) (2007). 
260. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. at 2537 
(CWA § 402 has exclusive list of nine criteria, leaving no room for EPA to consider the 
protection of listed species); EPIC v. Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d 1073, 1080–81 (9th Cir. 
2001) (permit gave agency discretionary power to impose protections for the spotted owl, 
but not species listed after the permit was issued). 
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operational discretion for purposes of § 402.03 and ESA § 7.261  
Congress enacted such a statute in response to the Tenth Circuit’s 
decision in the Silvery Minnow case262 when it prohibited USBR from 
using its discretion, “if any, to restrict, reduce or reallocate any 
water stored in Heron Reservoir or delivered pursuant to San Juan-
Chama Project contracts . . . to meet the requirements of the 
Endangered Species Act . . . .”263 That sort of specific, unambiguous 
language would certainly be effective in freeing USBR from its 
duties under § 7(a)(2).  But because few projects have anything 
like this San Juan-Chama statute, there is only a weak argument 
that all the others must be operated according to a non-
discretionary statutory mandate under the NAHB test. 
3. Water Supply Contracts do not Divest USBR of Operating 
Discretion. 
In the absence of a statute that would deprive USBR of the 
discretion needed to trigger its duties under ESA § 7,264 the 
government’s position has been that its contracts with certain water 
users leave it no discretion to reduce deliveries to those users, 
regardless of the ESA.  As summarized by the Tenth Circuit in 
Silvery Minnow, “BOR contends that the Repayment Contracts 
define their obligations under the ESA.  Because the contracts do 
not expressly permit a reduction in deliveries of project water 
below their fixed amounts, BOR maintains it lacks discretion to 
comply with the ESA” under 50 C.F.R. § 402.03.265  In other words, 
261. Of course, Congress has imposed other mandatory, statutory duties on the 
Reclamation program from the very outset.  For example, § 5 of the 1902 Act limited the 
number of acres on which any landowner could receive project water, and also required that 
the landowner “be an actual bona fide resident on such land.”  Reclamation Act of June 17, 
1902 § 5, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 389, codified at 43 U.S.C. § 431(2007). 
262. See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1007 (describing and 
citing to the relevant provisions of appropriations acts for fiscal year 2004 (imposing one-
year restriction on use of San Juan-Chama Project water) and fiscal year 2005 (making the 
restriction permanent)). 
263. Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-137 § 
208, 117 Stat. 1827 (Dec. 1, 2003). 
264. The 2003 appropriations rider regarding the San Juan-Chama Project, id., was 
enacted after the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109 
(10th Cir. 2003), and before that decision was vacated as moot, 355 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 
2004).  However, no such statute applies to the Middle Rio Grande Project, where USBR’s 
discretion to operate for the benefit of the minnow remains a live issue.  Rio Grande Silvery 
Minnow v. Keys, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1009 (D.N.M. 2005). 
265. 333 F.3d at 1127 (footnote omitted). 
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the government maintains that the contracts represent a binding 
commitment by USBR that forces the agency to operate its projects 
in a way that ensures full water supplies to the contract users, 
leaving no authority to reduce those supplies to avoid jeopardy to 
listed species. 
There are several fundamental problems with this argument.  
Most obviously, these contracts are not statutes, and so they do not 
present the “implied repeal” problem that was fundamental to the 
Court’s analysis in NAHB.266 Further, no statute elevates these 
contracts to the status of a nondiscretionary mandate that USBR 
must meet regardless of any other legal responsibility.  The NAHB 
majority opinion repeatedly emphasizes that an agency need not 
comply with ESA § 7(a)(2) if its requirements seemingly conflict 
with another mandatory federal statute.267  Although NAHB does not 
state that only statutorily required actions can be non-discretionary 
under § 402.03, neither does it give any indication that anything 
else would qualify, and no other argument for avoiding the 
statutory mandates of ESA § 7 would fit the NAHB rationale.268 
The contracts themselves do not lock USBR into operating its 
projects solely for the benefit of the contract water users.  The 
agency apparently takes the position that it has no discretion even 
to take actions that would increase the risk that these users will not 
receive a full water supply from its projects.269  Many contracts 
266. See supra  notes 176–185 and accompanying text. 
267. 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2533 (ESA “alters § 402(b)’s statutory command,” and would also 
“result in the implicit repeal of many additional otherwise categorical statutory commands”); 
id. at 2534 (Section 402.03 resolves the problem by excusing compliance with § 7 “when the 
agency is forbidden from considering such extrastatutory factors,” and is reasonable because 
it does not interpret § 7 “to override express statutory mandates”); id. at 2535 (“an agency 
cannot be considered the legal cause of an action that it has no statutory discretion not to 
take”) (emphasis in the original); id. at 2536 (“§ 7(a)(2)’s no-jeopardy mandate covers only 
discretionary agency actions and does not attach to actions . . . that an agency is required by 
statute to undertake . . . .”) (emphasis in the original). 
268. See id. at 2536 (§ 402.03 is reasonable interpretation of statute “because it gives effect 
to the ESA’s provision, but also comports with the canon against implied repeals because it 
stays § 7(a)(2)’s mandate where it would effectively override otherwise mandatory statutory 
duties”). 
269. USBR evidently took this position in 2002, when it refused to release water from 
Heron Reservoir at the end of the irrigation season for the benefit of the silvery minnow, 
even though users had already received all their contracted water for that year.  The agency 
refused to release the water because it was concerned that 2003 and future years would also 
be dry, and chose to hold all available water in the reservoir so as not to risk cutting future 
deliveries to contract users.  Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1231-
34 (D.N.M. 2002).  The court wrote, “The BOR gives the benefit of the doubt to a dire 
 2008] Reclamation Projects and the ESA 47 
 
provide for delivery of a specific quantity of water,270 but nearly all 
USBR contracts also have terms that shield the government from 
liability for failing to deliver a full water supply on account of 
drought or other causes.271  The government argues that these 
hold-harmless clauses apply “only to circumstances in which it is 
‘impossible’ to deliver the fixed contractual water, not to situations 
in which it creates the shortage for purposes of complying with the 
ESA.”272  That argument conflicts not only with the broad “other 
causes” language contained in many of these contract provisions, 
but also with cases interpreting such provisions in the context of 
requirements imposed by the ESA and other statutes.273  Judge 
Kelly, dissenting in Silvery Minnow, argued that these clauses are 
“exculpatory” and “defensive in nature, and do not represent an 
affirmative grant of discretion to enforce the ESA.”274  Nonetheless, 
they represent a recognition that the contracts do not guarantee a 
fixed quantity of water, and that drought is only one circumstance 
that may prevent the project from delivering a full supply.  Judge 
Kelly is probably right in arguing that these provisions do not 
provide an affirmative grant of discretion to USBR, but he is almost 
certainly wrong in suggesting that without such an affirmative grant 
of discretion, the contracts alone would free USBR of any duties to 
comply with ESA § 7(a)(2). 
drought prediction, not to the silvery minnow.  BOR and the FWS propose to put the silvery 
minnow in certain jeopardy now based on the assumption of continued drought conditions 
in the future.”  Id. at 1233.  The court also noted that in deciding whether to hold water in 
the reservoir or release it for the minnow in 2002, “the potential harm to [project] 
contractors in releasing water from Heron Reservoir was emphasized while the harm to the 
silvery minnow was downplayed.”  Id. at 1234. 
270. For example, Albuquerque’s contract for San Juan-Chama Project water specifies 
101,800 acre-feet.  See Silvery Minnow, 333 F.3d at 1123–24. 
271. See id. at 1124, 1126.  The language of these clauses varies somewhat from contract to 
contract, but commentators and courts have noted that clauses of this type appear in USBR 
contracts “with high consistency.”  See id. at 1146 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (quoting Benson, 
supra note 37, at 393–94). 
272. See id. at 1127 (emphasis in original).  For example, the failure of the newly 
completed Teton Dam made it impossible for USBR to perform its water delivery contracts.  
See Fremont-Madison Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 763 F.2d 1084, 1088 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(denying recovery for water losses caused by Teton Dam failure, based in part on contract 
language absolving the U.S. of liability for losses caused by failure of storage facilities). 
273. See, e.g., O’Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 682--83 (finding a clause excusing 
government liability for failure to deliver water “on account of errors in operation, drought, 
or any other causes” covered shortages caused by requirements of the ESA and Central 
Valley Project Improvement Act). 
274. See Silvery Minnow, 333 F.3d at 1151 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
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This last point is reinforced by a basic principle of federal 
contract law, the sovereign acts doctrine.  The Supreme Court has 
stated this principle as follows: 
 
While the Federal Government, as sovereign, has the power to enter 
contracts that confer vested rights, and the concomitant duty to 
honor those rights, we have declined in the context of commercial 
contracts to find that a sovereign forever waives the right to exercise 
one of its sovereign powers unless it expressly reserves the right to 
exercise that power in the contract.  Rather, we have emphasized that 
without regard to its source, sovereign power, even when 
unexercised, is an enduring presence that governs all contracts 
subject to the sovereign’s jurisdiction, and will remain intact unless 
surrendered in unmistakable terms.  Therefore, contractual 
arrangements, including those to which a sovereign itself is party, 
remain subject to subsequent legislation by the sovereign.275 
 
The Ninth Circuit applied this principle to a USBR contract as 
early as 1990,276 and used it to uphold the application of the federal 
environmental laws to such contracts in 1993.277  In the Tenth 
Circuit’s vacated Silvery Minnow opinion, both majority judges 
produced a concurring opinion stating that because the contracts 
did not waive the government’s sovereign authority in 
unmistakable terms, the ESA “modifies the contracts because the 
contracts do not affirmatively state that future legislation will not 
apply.”278  Most recently, the Court of Federal Claims—in a 
remarkably thorough and scholarly opinion on this subject—relied 
on the sovereign acts doctrine to hold that USBR did not breach its 
contracts with Klamath Project water users when it withheld water 
for endangered species in 2001,279 resulting in shortages for project 
275. Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52 (1986) 
(quotations omitted). 
276. See Peterson v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 811--12 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(upholding “hammer clause” of 1982 Reclamation Reform Act regarding delivery of project 
water to lands in excess of legal acreage limit). 
277. See Madera Irrigation Dist. v. Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397, 1406 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(upholding potential modification of contract terms resulting from application of ESA or 
National Environmental Policy Act). 
278. Silvery Minnow, 333 F.3d at 1139 (Seymour, J., concurring).  This concurring opinion 
stated that it was applying the unmistakable terms doctrine, but the principle is the same one 
stated in Bowen.  See supra note 276 and accompanying text. 
279. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 677 (2007).  Having found that 
enactment of the ESA was a sovereign act within the terms of the doctrine, the court 
concluded that: 
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irrigators.280 
The 1996 case of United States v. Winstar Corp.,281 in which the 
Supreme Court produced four opinions but none gained a 
majority of votes, has created significant uncertainty about the 
future application of the sovereign acts doctrine to federal 
contracts.282  In both the Silvery Minnow concurrence and the 
Klamath case, however, the courts sorted through the Winstar mess 
and concluded that the doctrine does cover the application of the 
 
[I]f the sovereign acts doctrine is applicable, the government is not liable for contract 
violations caused by a sovereign act, unless the unmistakability doctrine is triggered. . . . 
Here, as plaintiffs readily admit, there are no unmistakable terms in any of the contracts 
precluding the government from exercising its sovereign powers-indeed, the water 
shortage clauses in most of the contracts reflect the opposite intent. Instead, plaintiffs 
assert that any silence of the contracts on this point should be read in their favor, as 
precluding the United States from enforcing the ESA. That claim, however, is decidedly 
contrary to the law regarding the unmistakability doctrine and, indeed, would turn that 
doctrine on its head. 
 
Id. at 695 (citations omitted). 
280. Another recent case from the Court of Federal Claims, however, states that the 
sovereign acts doctrine would not have protected the government from liability for failing to 
deliver a full water supply from the New Melones Dam because it would not have been 
impossible for the government to do so and still meet its duties under the environmental laws.  
Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 321, 372--73 (2007).  That conclusion 
is dictum, however, because the court determined for other reasons that the plaintiff had 
failed to prove that USBR breached the contracts.  Id. at 376.  On plaintiffs’ motion for 
reconsideration, the court rejected the government’s arguments that it had misapplied the 
sovereign acts doctrine, and explained why it had required the government to show that 
performance was impossible.  Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 497 
(2007).  There is an active disagreement among the courts about whether the government 
must show impossibility of performance in order to gain the benefit of the sovereign acts 
doctrine.  See Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. at 508–12 (impossibility 
is required); Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. at 691–95 (impossibility is 
not required).  However, even if the government needs to show that it cannot possibly 
comply with both its ESA duties and its contracts, it may be able to meet this burden in some 
circumstances.  For example, the government argued that it couldn’t possibly give water to 
the irrigators and the silvery minnow at the end of the 2002 irrigation season.  See Rio 
Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1225--26 (D.N.M. 2002). 
281. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996).  In Winstar, the Court found the 
government liable for breaching contracts with certain financial institutions.  A later-enacted 
federal statute had effectively nullified a key element of those contracts, and the Court 
determined that the sovereign acts doctrine did not shield the government from liability in 
that case. 
282. For an excellent analysis of Winstar and a discussion of its potential effect on future 
contract disputes—including those involving USBR contracts—see Michael W. Graf, The 
Determination of Property Rights in Public Contracts after Winstar v. United States: Where Has the 
Supreme Court Left Us? 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 197 (1998). 
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Endangered Species Act to USBR contracts.283  The Winstar plurality 
opinion seemed to narrow the sovereign acts doctrine by stating 
that it applies only in circumstances where sovereign power would 
be blocked284—but sovereign power would indeed be blocked if the 
contracts left USBR with no power to protect species under ESA § 
7(a)(2), and so that crucial aspect of Winstar is no help to the 
government or the contract users in this context.285  Given that the 
ESA is clearly a “sovereign act” that was not intended to change 
contract terms for the government’s benefit, and that very few if 
any USBR contracts could be construed as unmistakably 
surrendering the government’s sovereign powers, it would certainly 
appear that this basic principle of federal contract law does apply in 
this context.286 
Here again, the sovereign acts doctrine does not affirmatively 
grant discretion for purposes of § 402.03, but it does not need to.  
The question is whether water supply contracts eliminate USBR’s 
discretion so as to preclude it from meeting its mandatory duties 
under ESA § 7.  Under the sovereign acts doctrine, the contracts 
could do so only if they surrendered the government’s powers in 
unmistakable terms.  USBR simply did not abandon all 
discretionary power when it entered into contracts to supply 
project water.  To the contrary, under basic principles of federal 
law, Congress essentially assured that the government could 
continue to exercise ongoing sovereign power when it provided for 
Reclamation project water to be delivered under contract.287 
283. In Silvery Minnow, the two concurring judges analyzed both the Winstar plurality and 
dissenting opinions and concluded that either approach would leave the doctrine applicable 
to the dispute over contracts and the ESA on the Rio Grande.  333 F.3d at 1140--41 
(Seymour, J., concurring).  In Klamath Irrigation District, 75 Fed. Cl. at 682--95, the court 
considered and rejected a variety of plaintiffs’ arguments based on Winstar. 
284. 518 U.S. at 879.  The plurality found that the government could not rely on the 
doctrine in that case, because the Winstar plaintiffs sought only damages, and their requested 
relief did not amount to an exemption from the new law.  Id. at 881--82. 
285. See Silvery Minnow, 333 F.3d at 1140 (Seymour, J., concurring). 
286. See Klamath Irrigation District, 75 Fed. Cl. at 683–85, 695 (plaintiffs admit that Klamath 
Project contracts have no such terms).  The government has argued that the sovereign acts 
doctrine does not apply to USBR contracts because the ESA has not directly required that 
project water be dedicated to species habitat.  Brief of Federal Defendants-Appellants at 54–
55, Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, Nos. 05-2399, 06-2020, and 06-2021 (10th Cir. filed 
Dec. 2005–Jan. 2006).  The government has cited no authority to indicate that the doctrine 
applies only where the statute itself, as opposed to action by the regulatory agencies 
entrusted by Congress with administering the statute, creates a conflict with contractual 
obligations. 
287. Contracts have been a part of the Reclamation program from its early days, and a 
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Under § 402.03 as interpreted by the courts, USBR’s obligation 
to consult in operating its projects comes down to the existence or 
absence of agency discretion.  This discretion question will be 
answered primarily by standard legal analysis, through the 
interpretion of statutes, contracts, and cases.  But as with any ESA 
controversy, serious policy issues are bubbling just below the 
surface of the legal dispute.  The remainder of this section 
identifies policy concerns that relate to USBR’s project operation 
duties under § 7. 
C. Policy Concerns Relating to Exempting Project Operations from 
Section 7 
Underlying the legal dispute about agency discretion is a policy 
difference over the proper application of § 7 to federal projects 
that have supplied water for irrigation and other purposes since 
before the ESA was enacted.  Conservationists tend to regard § 7 as 
an essential tool for ensuring the continued existence of aquatic 
and riparian species whose habitats have been dramatically altered 
by USBR projects (among other factors).  Water users, on the other 
hand, believe that the water from these projects belongs to them 
because they have used it for years and have met their obligations 
under their government contracts.  These two camps may agree 
generally on the desirability of preserving both irrigation and 
endangered species, but not on whether it is appropriate for the 
ESA to shift project water from farmers to fish.  Aside from that 
simple question of values, however, the question of § 7(a)(2)’s 
application to project operations raises some more nuanced issues. 
Excluding project water deliveries from the § 7 consultation and 
no-jeopardy requirements would represent a change from 
established practice on many projects, where USBR has been 
consulting for several years on the effects of its operations on listed 
species.288  In other words, “no discretion for USBR” means less 
requirement of the program since 1926, when Congress prohibited delivery of water from 
any new project “until a contract or contracts in form approved by the Secretary shall have 
been made with an irrigation district or irrigation districts,” providing for payments in 
annual installments over a period not exceeding 40 years.  Act of May 25, 1926, ch. 383, 44 
Stat. 649 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 423e).  By then, however, many contracts were already in 
existence, and the statute authorized the Secretary to amend existing contracts.  44 Stat. 648, 
codified at 43 U.S.C. § 423d. 
288. This is true at least for projects located within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit.  
For example, FWS issued its first BO on the effects of Klamath Project operations on Lost 
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protection for listed species affected by Reclamation water 
deliveries, especially as to those projects where ESA consultations 
have already occurred.  This rollback could mean extinction in the 
wild for the Rio Grande silvery minnow and serious trouble for 
other species whose survival depends on adequate water from a 
USBR project.  Moreover, it is highly unlikely that any other 
(existing) federal law would fill the resulting void in regulatory 
protection for these species, given the basic premise that project 
water deliveries are so firmly anchored in legal concrete that even 
ESA § 7(a)(2) cannot budge them.289 
It is true that USBR project operations and associated water uses 
would remain subject to ESA § 9 and its prohibition on “take” of a 
listed animal.290  Both in practice and in policy, however, § 9 
enforcement makes a poor substitute for § 7 consultation in its 
application to Reclamation projects.  In practice, § 9 cases have 
always been rare; despite the relatively clear causal links between 
water withdrawals, dry streams, and dead fish,291 there is still no 
reported decision finding a “take” resulting from diversions that 
dewatered a river.292  A dramatic increase in § 9 enforcement 
River and shortnose suckers in 1992.  See Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n v. Patterson, 
204 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 1999).  NMFS produced its first BO on CVP operations on 
winter Chinook salmon in 1993.  See Barcellos & Wolfsen v. Westlands Water Dist., 849 F. 
Supp. 717, 724 n.13 (E.D. Cal. 1993).  In revising the “Operating Criteria and Procedures” 
governing operation of the Newlands Project (Nevada), USBR consulted with FWS on effects 
of the revisions on the cui-ui fish as early as 1988.  See 62 Fed. Reg. 66,441, 66,463 (Dec. 18, 
1997). 
289. In California, a state statute—Section 5937 of the Fish and Game Code—may protect 
fish populations below USBR dams.  In litigation over the operation of Friant Dam, a part of 
the CVP, the courts held that USBR was subject to § 5937 because that statute was a state law 
requiring USBR compliance under § 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act.  Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. Patterson, 333 F. Supp. 2d 906, 919–21 (reviewing law of the case 
regarding application of § 5937 to USBR); id. at 924–25 (holding that USBR has violated § 
5937 in operating Friant Dam). 
290. See supra notes 54–61 and accompanying text. 
291. One should not underestimate, however, the conceptual and practical challenges of 
proving “take” of listed fish in the context of water management and use.  See James R. 
Rasband, Priority, Probability, and Proximate Cause: Lessons from Tort Law about Imposing ESA 
Responsibility for Wildlife Harm on Water Users and Other Joint Habitat Modifiers, 33 ENVTL. L. 595, 
609–23 (analyzing several such problems). 
292. For a discussion of the shortcomings of § 9 enforcement in protecting listed species, 
see Reed D. Benson, So Much Conflict, Yet So Much in Common: Considering the Similarities 
between Western Water Law and the Endangered Species Act, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 29, 61 (2004).  
This article notes an unreported federal court decision from Idaho finding take by a water 
user.  The Ninth Circuit later reversed and remanded, holding that the district court 
improperly granted summary judgment in light of a factual dispute about the harm caused 
by defendant’s diversions.  Idaho Watersheds Project v. Jones, No. 03-35870, slip op. at 3 (9th 
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actions seems unlikely, although if § 7 no longer applies to USBR 
project water deliveries, it is reasonable to expect environmental or 
fishing groups to bring a few more cases.  But even if such cases 
restore some measure of protection for listed species, § 9 is inferior 
to § 7 in the context of USBR project operations.  Compared to the 
consultation process, “take” enforcement will mean more decisions 
made in the federal courts rather than the expert agencies, greater 
focus on establishing past harm to individual listed animals rather 
than developing “reasonable and prudent alternatives” to conserve 
the species in the future,293 and increased scrutiny of the actions of 
private water users rather than the government’s operations.294 
Collaborative processes are another potential source of 
protection for listed species, and USBR has argued in favor of this 
approach for addressing ESA issues associated with project water 
use.295  Existing cooperative efforts regarding listed species and 
USBR projects, however, got their start primarily because key 
players—including water users and western state governments—
were concerned that § 7 consultations on project operations might 
result in reduced deliveries for existing uses.296  For example, the 
Cir. Apr. 18, 2005). 
293. The ESA implementing rules define “reasonable and prudent alternatives” to mean 
“alternative actions identified during formal consultation that can be implemented in a 
manner consistent with the intended purpose of the action, that can be implemented 
consistent with the scope of the Federal agency’s legal authority and jurisdiction, that is [sic] 
economically and technologically feasible,” and that the Service believes would avoid 
jeopardy to the species or adverse modification of critical habitat.  50 C.F.R. § 402.02. 
294. Environmental plaintiffs have sometimes (successfully) sued government agencies 
rather than private resource users, arguing that the government violated § 9 by authorizing 
private activities that resulted in take.  For example, the First Circuit held that the State of 
Massachusetts violated § 9 by issuing permits for fixed fishing gear to be placed in that state’s 
coastal waters, where that gear was harming endangered whales.  Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 
155, 162--66 (1st Cir. 1997).  But if USBR were to establish that it had no discretion to reduce 
project water deliveries for purposes of § 7, it would have an excellent argument that its 
operations are not the legal cause of harm to the species under § 9.  Thus, the focus would 
shift to the water users themselves, whose diversions could be viewed as the proximate cause 
of any alleged harm to the protected species.  See generally Rasband, supra note 323, at 623--29 
(arguing against “vicarious liability” for government agencies under ESA § 9, especially in the 
context of water use in the West). 
295. In its 2003 Water 2025 policy statement, USBR stated that success in meeting ESA 
requirements “almost always requires a collaborative effort between stakeholders,” and went 
on to say that “the twin goals of recovery of endangered species and meeting the water needs 
of people cannot be attained when the issues and resources are locked into a cycle of short-
term litigation and decision-making.” U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF 
RECLAMATION, WATER 2025: PREVENTING CRISES AND CONFLICT IN THE WEST 20 (August 
2005), available at http://www.doi.gov/water2025/Water%202025-08-05.pdf. 
296. See Benson, supra note 324, at 74–75 (discussing importance of the ESA in 
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State of Wyoming has complained about the cooperative federal-
state program for addressing ESA issues on the central Platte River, 
but has remained involved because it wants to avoid the Platte 
becoming “another Klamath.”297  If it becomes clear that the Platte 
will not become the next Klamath because § 7 does not apply to the 
operation of USBR projects on the North Platte River, the State of 
Wyoming, at least, may well pick up its marbles and go home.298  To 
the extent that ESA § 7 no longer creates uncertainty about future 
water deliveries from USBR projects, cooperative efforts are likely 
either to disband or to continue their existence primarily for public 
relations purposes.  It is ironic that USBR has urged cooperation as 
the only sensible path for addressing ESA concerns associated with 
project water uses, while simultaneously pursuing a legal strategy 
that would remove the primary motivation for such efforts to make 
meaningful strides toward conserving listed species. 
In contrast to cooperative efforts, the push to remove USBR 
project operations from § 7 coverage offers no “win-win” solutions.  
To the extent that the courts uphold the government’s position 
and agree that there is no discretion to reduce water deliveries 
despite the ESA, the users simply gain certainty and the species 
simply lose protection.  At best it’s a zero-sum game, and if it leads 
to a decline in cooperative efforts and a rise in § 9 enforcement 
cases, the game will only get more contentious, focusing more on 
motivating cooperative efforts to address water use impacts on listed species, including the 
“CalFed” initiative, the Carson-Truckee water settlement, and the Upper Colorado 
Endangered Fish Recovery Program). 
297. Mike Besson, at that time the Director of the Wyoming Water Development 
Commission, said in 2004 that he did not like the cooperative program for endangered 
species recovery in the Platte River Basin, but that Wyoming would remain in the process.  
“What I’m trying to prevent is another Klamath.”  Andrew Beck Grace, Truce Holds on the 
Platte River, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Aug. 16, 2004, at 3. 
298. Wyoming Governor Dave Freudenthal announced in 2006 that he was signing the 
agreement reluctantly because “there are no good choices in this area.”  Without a 
cooperative agreement, he wrote, Wyoming would be faced with a “federal regulatory 
framework in which . . . the states, municipalities, industries, and irrigators would be left 
subject to the whims of the federal government in the context of individual consultations— 
on both new and existing uses—on any project or activity in the Platte River Basin which has 
a federal nexus.”  In signing the agreement, however, Freudenthal wrote that he took “solace 
from [Nebraska] Governor Heineman’s recent correspondence and his reminder that, if at 
any time the Program progresses in a direction counter to the best interests of Wyoming, I 
can push away from the table and take a different course.”  Press Release, Governor Dave 
Freudenthal, Governor Signs On to Platte River Agreement (Nov. 27, 2006), available at 
http://www.waterchat.com/News/State/06/Q4/state_061201-03.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 
2007). 
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establishing liability and less on developing solutions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In the Tulare Lake case discussed above,299 the Court of Federal 
Claims found that ESA restrictions had taken plaintiffs’ water 
rights, and concluded with the following sentence: “The federal 
government is certainly free to preserve the fish; it must simply pay 
for the water it takes to do so.”300  One could disagree sharply with 
the court’s legal analysis—and many have301—yet still perceive some 
basic equity in that final soundbite. 
The dispute over USBR’s discretion in operating its projects, 
however, is not a matter of compensation for water users.  The 
question is whether the government remains “free to preserve the 
fish” and other imperiled species.  If the answer is no, that would 
represent a loss of existing protection for species affected by USBR 
projects, an unwarranted extension of the Court’s recent decision 
in NAHB, and a rollback of a statute whereby Congress once made 
saving species from extinction the highest of national priorities.  
299. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text. 
300. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 324 (2001). 
301. As noted by the Court of Federal Claims in another case involving a claim by 
irrigators that ESA restrictions had taken their water rights, “Tulare has been the subject of 
intense criticism by commentators who, inter alia, have challenged the court’s application of 
a physical taking theory to what was a temporary reduction in water.”  Klamath Irrigation 
Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 538 n.59 (citing three articles); see also Melinda Harm 
Benson, supra note 87, at 583–87. 
